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4.	1.	Introduction	
Connectivity	 refers	 to	 the	 extent	 and	 quality	 of	 links	 across	 a	 number	 of	 different	 dimensions.	
Connectivity	 is	 a	 crucial	 component	 of	 ASEAN	 integration.	 In	 order	 to	 promote	 and	 establish	 the	
ASEAN	Community	by	2015,	a	High	Level	Task	Force	developed	a	Master	Plan	on	ASEAN	connectivity	
with	the	assistance	of	a	number	of	other	international	organisations	working	in	the	region	(ASEAN,	
2011).1	
The	 Master	 Plan	 recommends	 improved	 connectivity	 through	 enhanced	 regional	 and	 national	
linkages.	It	outlines	a	number	of	benefits	arising	from	greater	connectivity	among	ASEAN	members:	
“Enhancing	 intra-regional	connectivity	promotes	economic	growth,	narrows	the	development	gaps	
by	 sharing	 the	 benefits	 of	 growth	 with	 poorer	 groups	 and	 communities,	 enhances	 the	
competitiveness	of	ASEAN,	and	connects	 its	Member	States	within	the	region	and	with	the	rest	of	
the	world”	(ASEAN,	2011,	pp.5).	The	recent	Global	Economic	Crisis	(GEC)	led	to	a	fall	in	demand	for	
ASEAN	exports	from	advanced	economies	and	this	heightens	the	importance	of	enhancing	regional	
demand	 through	 increased	 intra-regional	 trade	 (Bhattacharyay,	 2009).	 Improving	 ASEAN	
connectivity	is	required	to	assist	with	this	objective.		
The	Master	Plan	is	to	be	enacted	over	the	period	2011	to	2015	and	seeks	to	forge	greater	linkages	
among	 ASEAN	 Member	 States	 (AMS)	 through	 enhancing	 three	 types	 of	 linkages:	 (i)	 physical	
connectivity;	 (ii)	 institutional	 connectivity;	 and	 (iii)	 people-to-people	 connectivity.	 	 Physical	
connectivity	 refers	 to	 the	 development	 of	 national	 and	 regional	 infrastructure	 development,	
specifically	in	the	transport,	Information	and	Communications	Technology	(ICT)	and	energy	sectors.	
Physical	connectivity	is	commonly	referred	to	as	‘hard	infrastructure’	and	plays	a	very	important	role	
in	 connecting	 ASEAN’s	 massive	 lad	 area,	 diverse	 geography	 and	 numerous	 islands.	 Institutional	
connectivity	 relates	 to	 the	 policy	 environment	 of	 member	 countries	 and	 includes	 effective	
governance	and	institutions.	It	is	often	referred	to	as	‘soft	infrastructure’.2	Finally,	people-to-people	
connectivity	refers	to	empowering	people	and	includes	greater	linkages	among	ASEAN	members	in	
the	areas	of	education,	culture,	tourism	(ASEAN,	2011).	
There	 are	 great	 differences	 in	 the	 level	 of	 development	 across	 ASEAN	 countries,	 as	 discussed	 at	
length	 in	Chapter	 two,	 as	well	 as	 significant	differences	 in	 culture	 and	 language.	According	 to	 the	
World	Bank	classification,	ASEAN	members	include	high	income	countries	(Brunei,	Singapore)	as	well	
as	some	of	the	world’s	least	developed	countries	(Cambodia,	Laos	and	Myanmar).	There	is	also	great	
diversity	 in	 the	 geography	 of	 ASEAN	 members.	 The	 needs	 and	 infrastructure	 solutions	 are	 very	
different	for	the	small	city	state	of	Singapore	compared	to	landlocked	Laos,	mountainous	Myanmar	
or	 the	 thousands	 of	 islands	 of	 Indonesia	 and	 the	 Philippines.	 ASEAN’s	 traditional	 focus	 on	 export	
orientation	 has	 led	 to	 coastal	 bias	 in	 infrastructure	 development	 but	 connecting	 inland,	 remote	
areas	 as	 well	 as	 ASEAN	 numerous	 islands	 to	 major	 ports	 and	 economic	 centres	 can	 yield	 great	
benefits	(Bhattacharyay,	2009).	
There	are	also	 large	 infrastructure	gaps	between	ASEAN	countries	with	Cambodia,	Laos,	Myanmar	
and	 Indonesia	 having	 less	 access	 to	 different	 types	 of	 physical	 infrastructure	 than	 other	 ASEAN	
members.	 Reducing	 these	 physical	 infrastructure	 gaps	will	 be	 vital	 to	 narrowing	 the	 development	
gap.	 The	 quality	 of	 infrastructure	 also	 varies	 greatly,	 being	 much	 higher	 in	 Singapore,	 Brunei,	
																																								 																				
1	These	organisations	included	the	Asian	Development	Bank	(ADB),	the	Economic	Research	Institute	for	ASEAN	
and	East	Asia	(ERIA),	United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	Commission	for	Asian	and	the	Pacific	(UNESCAP)	and	
the	World	Bank.	
2	 The	 ASEAN	 Master	 Plan	 includes	 the	 following	 as	 institutional	 connectivity:	 (i)	 trade	 liberalisation	 and	
facilitation;	 (ii)	 investment	 and	 services;	 (iii)	 liberalisation	 and	 facilitation;	 (iv)	 mutual	 recognition	
agreements/arrangements;	(v)	regional	transport	agreements;	(vi)	cross-border	procedures;	and	(vii)	capacity	
building	programmes	(ASEAN,	2011,	pp.2).	
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Malaysia	and	Thailand	relative	to	the	other	ASEAN	members.	Greater	people-to-people	connectivity	
also	 holds	 great	 potential	 in	 narrowing	 the	 development	 gap	 among	 ASEAN	 countries,	 greatly	
benefiting	both	sending	countries	(largely	through	remittances)	and	host	countries	(by	filling	labour	
shortages	and	skills	gaps).			
While	there	are	clear,	tangible	benefits	of	greater	connectivity,	ASEAN	countries	also	face	a	number	
of	 challenges	 in	 realising	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	Master	 Plan.	 Huge	 investments	will	 be	 required	 to	
build	 both	 the	 hard	 and	 soft	 infrastructure	 necessary	 to	 narrow	 the	 development	 gap.	 ASEAN	
countries	need	to	fund	infrastructure	investments	averaging	US$60	billion	per	year	to	2015	as	well	
as	 successfully	 integrating	 infrastructure	programs	 that	are	being	undertaken	at	 the	national,	 sub-
regional	 and	 regional	 levels.	 Moreover,	 the	 environmental	 and	 social	 impacts	 of	 large	 scale	
infrastructure	 projects	 and	 the	 greater	 mobility	 of	 ASEAN’s	 people	 will	 need	 to	 be	 addressed.	
Political	 commitment	 to	 addressing	 brain	 drain	 and	 social	 impacts	 of	 migration	 will	 also	 require	
attention.		
This	chapter	examines	in	detail	how	each	of	the	three	dimensions	of	connectivity	can	assist	ASEAN	in	
narrowing	 the	 development	 gap	 among	 its	 members.	 Section	 4.2	 defines	 physical	 infrastructure	
before	highlighting	the	very	strong	positive	association	between	indicators	of	physical	infrastructure	
and	development.	 It	also	examines	the	current	state	of	physical	 infrastructure	in	AMS	and	outlines	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 can	 contribute	 to	 narrowing	 the	 development	 gap.	 The	 empirical	 evidence	
regarding	 physical	 infrastructure	 and	 development	 is	 also	 assessed.	 Section	 4.3	 examines	
institutional	connectivity,	 including	how	 it	 is	defined	and	 its	 relationship	with	development.	 It	also	
examines	 how	 AMS	 perform	 across	 different	 indicators	 of	 institutional	 connectivity.	 Section	 4.4	
examines	 people-to-people	 connectivity	 and	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 that	 greater	 labour	mobility	 and	
migration	can	play	 in	narrowing	the	development	gap.	Section	4.5	summarises	the	challenges	that	
ASEAN	countries	face	in	improving	connectivity	in	all	of	these	areas	and	Section	4.6	concludes.	
4.	2.	Physical	Connectivity	and	Narrowing	the	Development	Gap	
4.2.1	What	is	physical	infrastructure?	
Physical	or	hard	 infrastructure	 is	 rarely	precisely	defined	but	usually	refers	 to	the	facilities	used	to	
deliver	 energy,	 transport,	 water	 and	 sanitation	 and	 telecommunications	 (Estache,	 2006;	 Straub,	
2008).	 Physical	 infrastructure	 includes:	 (i)	 transport	 infrastructure	 such	 as	 roads,	 bridges,	 tunnels,	
railways,	 waterways,	 sea	 ports	 and	 airports,	 (ii)	 power	 utilities	 or	 energy	 infrastructure	 including	
electricity	grids	and	gas	and	oil	pipelines	(as	well	as	renewable	energy	projects);	(iii)	Information	and	
Communication	Technology	(ICT)	 infrastructure	 including	fixed	 line	telephones,	mobile	telephones,	
undersea	 cables,	 satellite	 connections	 and	 access	 to	 the	 internet;	 and	 (iv)	 water	 and	 sanitation	
infrastructure	including	water	supply	and	sewerage	systems,	dams,	irrigation	and	flood	management	
systems.	 Broader	 definitions	 of	 infrastructure	might	 include	 hospitals,	 schools	 and	 other	 physical	
buildings.		
In	 addition	 to	 national	 physical	 infrastructure,	 there	 is	 Regional	 and	 Cross	 Border	 Infrastructure	
(R&CBI).	 Stafford	 (2005)	 identifies	 regional	 infrastructure	 as	 infrastructure	 projects	 implemented	
through	 a	 Regional	 Economic	 Community	 (REC)	 and	 cross	 border	 infrastructure	 as	 infrastructure	
projects	implemented	through	bilateral	agreements,	that	typically	connect	two	countries	only.	Since	
R&CBI	 involves	more	 than	one	country,	 such	projects	 require	political	 commitment	and	as	well	 as	
coordinated	policy	and	procedure	actions	(soft	infrastructure)	(Bhattacharyay,	2010).	Agreement	on	
the	 costs	 of	 R&CBI	 between	 countries	 can	 be	 very	 challenging	 given	 that	 there	 is	 often	 an	
asymmetric	distribution	of	benefits	(ADB/ADBI,	2009).		
4.2.2	The	relationship	between	physical	infrastructure	and	development	
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Physical	infrastructure	provides	a	vital	input	into	production	and	is	often	asserted	to	be	essential	for	
sustained	 economic	 growth	 and	 poverty	 reduction.	 Figures	 4.1	 to	 4.6	 below	 lend	 support	 to	 this	
notion.	 They	 provide	 very	 strong	 associations	 between	 different	measures	 of	 infrastructure	 (road	
density,	 mobile	 phone	 subscriptions	 and	 electricity	 power	 consumption)	 and	 the	 Human	
Development	Index	(HDI).	The	development	gap	among	ASEAN	members	according	to	the	HDI	was	a	
focus	of	Chapter	2.	The	figures	provide	the	relationships	for	all	countries	as	well	as	just	for	AMS.	The	
relationship	 between	 physical	 infrastructure	 and	 human	 development	 among	 ASEAN	 countries	
appears	 to	 be	 particularly	 strong.	 There	 are	 similar	 associations	 between	 the	 measures	 of	
infrastructure	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP),	as	provided	by	Figures	A4.1	to	A4.6	in	Appendix	X.	This	does	
not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 higher	 levels	 of	 physical	 infrastructure	 lead	 to	 better	 development	
outcomes	 since	 it	 could	 be	 a	 two	 way	 relationship	 or	 causality	 may	 run	 the	 other	 way.	 It	 does,	
however,	indicate	that	physical	infrastructure	and	development	indicators	are	highly	correlated	and	
that	physical	connectivity	can	play	an	important	role	in	narrowing	the	development	gap.		
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Figure	4.1:	Road	density	and	the	Human	Development	Index		
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012)	and	the	UNDP	(2011).	Data	for	the	HDI	are	for	2010.	Data	for	road	
density	are	the	latest	available	between	2003	and	2010.	
Figure	4.2:	Road	density	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012)	and	the	UNDP	(2011).	Data	for	the	HDI	are	for	2010.	Data	for	road	
density	are	the	latest	available	between	2003	and	2010.	
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Figure	4.3:	Mobile	phone	subscriptions	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).		
	
Figure	4.4:	Mobile	phone	subscriptions	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	(ASEAN	
countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).		
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Figure	4.5:	Electricity	power	consumption	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2009)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
	
Figure	4.6:	Electricity	power	consumption	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2009)	(ASEAN	
countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
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4.2.3	Physical	Infrastructure	in	ASEAN	countries	
Access	to	physical	infrastructure	varies	considerably	across	AMS.	Table	4.1	below	provides	indicators	
of	 access	 to	 infrastructure	 for	 ASEAN	 members.	 	 There	 is	 a	 particularly	 large	 gap	 in	 access	 to	
electricity,	with	100	per	cent	of	the	population	having	access	in	Singapore	compared	to	just	13	per	
cent	in	Myanmar	and	24	per	cent	in	Cambodia.	While	the	ASEAN	6	generally	has	high	rates	of	access	
to	 electricity,	 the	exception	 is	 Indonesia	with	 less	 than	 two-thirds	of	 its	 population	having	 access,	
while	 access	 is	 almost	 universal	 in	 Vietnam.	 In	 fact,	 Vietnam	has	 better	 access	 to	 all	measures	 of	
infrastructure	than	Indonesia	with	the	exception	of	rail	lines	and	the	percentage	of	paved	roads.		
Vietnam	 also	 has	 the	 highest	 rate	 of	 mobile	 subscriptions	 among	 all	 ASEAN	 countries.	 However,	
there	 is	 clearly	 a	 digital	 divide	 between	 the	 ASEAN6	 and	 Cambodia,	 Laos	 and	Myanmar	with	 the	
latter	 three	 countries	 having	 far	 lower	 internet	 users	 and	 mobile	 phone	 subscriptions	 (per	 100	
people).	 There	 is	 virtually	 no	 uptake	 of	 these	 types	 of	 technology	 in	Myanmar.	 However,	 growth	
rates	 in	access	 to	 technology	 (since	2000)	have	been	higher	 in	 the	ASEAN	4	 than	 for	 the	ASEAN	6	
suggesting	 some	 degree	 of	 catch	 up.	 Road	 density	 varies	 greatly	 across	 ASEAN	 members,	 with	
Singapore	 not	 surprisingly	 having	 by	 far	 the	 greatest	 density.	 Road	 density	 is	 particularly	 low	 in	
Myanmar,	 Lao	and	Cambodia	but	 relatively	high	 in	Vietnam.	While	 the	Philippines	has	a	 relatively	
high	 road	 density,	 less	 than	 10	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 country’s	 roads	 are	 paved,	 comparable	 with	
Cambodia,	Laos	and	Myanmar.	
Access	 to	 an	 improved	water	 source	 is	 relatively	 low	 in	 Cambodia	 and	 Laos.	 Access	 to	 improved	
sanitation	 is	 just	 31	 per	 cent	 in	 Cambodia	 and	 is	 also	 low	 in	 Laos	with	 Indonesia.	 Access	 to	 both	
improved	water	and	sanitation	is	universal	or	close	to	universal	in	Malaysia,	Singapore	and	Thailand	
and	reassuringly,	growth	in	access	to	improved	water	and	sanitation	since	2000	has	been	higher	in	
the	 ASEAN	 4	 than	 in	 the	 ASEAN	 6.	 The	 table	 clearly	 indicates	 that	 infrastructure	 investments	will	
need	to	be	biased	 in	 favour	of	Cambodia,	Laos	and	Myanmar	 for	a	narrowing	of	 the	development	
gap	to	be	realised.	
	
	
	
	
	 9	
Table	4.1:	Access	to	infrastructure	in	ASEAN	members	
	
Access	to	
electricity	
(%	of	
population)	
(2009)	
Internet	
users	(per	
100	
people)	
(2010)	
Mobile	
subscriptions	
(per	100	
people)	(2010)	
Rail	lines	(total	
route-km)	
(latest	
available)	
Road	density	(km	
of	road	per	100	
sq.	km)	(latest	
available)	
Roads,	paved	
(%	of	total	
roads)		(latest	
available)	
Improved	water	
source	(%	of	
population	with	
access)	(2010)	
Improved	
sanitation	
facilities	(%	of	
population	with	
access)	(2010)	
ASEAN	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Brunei	Darussalam	 99.7	 50.0	 109	 	 51	 81	 	 	
Indonesia	 64.5	 9.9	 92	 3,370	 25	 57	 82	 54	
Malaysia	 99.4	 56.3	 119	 1,665	 30	 81	 100	 96	
Philippines	 89.7	 25.0	 86	 479	 67	 10	 92	 74	
Singapore	 100	 71.1	 145	 	 473	 100	 100	 100	
Thailand	 99.3	 21.2	 104	 4,429	 35	 99	 96	 96	
ASEAN	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cambodia	 24	 1.3	 58	 650	 21	 6	 64	 31	
Lao	PDR	 55	 7.0	 65	 	 17	 14	 67	 63	
Myanmar	 13	 0.2	 1	 3,336	 4	 12	 83	 76	
Vietnam	 97.6	 27.9	 175	 2,347	 48	 48	 95	 76	
Source:	World	Bank	(2012)	
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An	 examination	 of	 current	 infrastructure	 in	 ASEAN	 countries	 must	 include	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	
numerous	 examples	 of	 R&CBI.	 These	 include	 sub-regional	 initiatives	 such	 as	 the	 Greater	Mekong	
Subregion	(GMS)	(a	program	to	help	implement	priority	transport,	energy	and	telecommunications	
projects	across	Cambodia,	Laos,	Myanmar,	Thailand,	Vietnam	and	a	province	in	China).	The	GMS	is	a	
very	 successful	 example	 of	 CBI,	 coordinating	more	 than	 $12	 billion	 in	 investments,	 particularly	 in	
establishing	all	weather	roads	between	Southern	Asia	and	China	(ADB,	2012).	Other	examples	of	CBI	
include	the	Mekong	River	Commission	(MRC)	(a		forum	for	Cambodia,	Laos,	Thailand	and	Vietnam	to	
manage	their	water	resources	and	the	sustainable	development	of	 the	Mekong	River),	 the	Brunei-
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippine	 East	 Asia	Growth	Area	 (BIMP-EAGA)	 (an	 initiative	 to	 increase	 trade,	
tourism	 and	 investment	 through	 infrastructure	 development),	 the	 Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand	
Growth	 Triangle	 (IMT-GT)	 (which	 aims	 to	 encourage	 trade,	 investment	 and	 private	 sector	 growth	
through	 infrastructure	 development),	 the	 Asian	 Highway	 (AH)	 and	 the	 Trans-Asian	 Railway	 (TAR)	
network	which	plan	to	link	Europe	with	Asia.	Examples	of	energy	sector	projects	include	the	ASEAN	
Power	Grid	and	the	Trans-ASEAN	Gas	Pipeline	which	aim	to	secure	a	cross-border	energy	network	
and	benefit	members	through	energy	trading	(Bhattacharyay,	2009).	
CBI	 relating	 specifically	 to	 the	 transport	 sector	 includes	 the	 flagship	 projects	 of	 the	 ASEAN	
Connectivity	 Master	 Plan.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 ASEAN	 Highway	 Network	 (AHN)	 which	 includes	 Transit	
Transport	 Routes	 (TTRs)	 which	 are	 considered	 critical	 for	 facilitating	 goods	 in	 transit.	 The	 other	
flagship	project	is	the	Singapore	Kunming	Rail	Link	(SKRL)	which	is	due	to	be	completed	in	2015.	In	
consists	 of	 several	 routes	 from	Singapore	 through	Malaysia,	 Thailand,	 Cambodia	 and	Viet	Nam	 to	
Kunming	 in	 China.	 Currently	 there	 are	 4,069	 km	 of	missing	 links	 or	 links	 that	 need	 rehabilitation	
(ASEAN,	2011).	
4.2.4	How	can	physical	infrastructure	contribute	to	narrowing	development	gaps?	
Physical	infrastructure	has	great	potential	to	increase	production	and	income	and	improve	access	to	
basic	services	such	as	health	education,	safe	water	and	improved	sanitation.	However,	the	impact	of	
infrastructure	on	narrowing	the	development	gap	in	ASEAN	countries	will,	to	a	large	extent,	depend	
on	 its	 type,	 quality	 and	 location.	 For	 infrastructure	 to	 narrow	 the	 development	 gap,	 spurring	
economic	growth	is	not	enough.	Economic	growth	must	occur	in	lagging	regions	and	infrastructure	
must	 link	 the	 poor	 to	 basic	 services	 and	 income	 earning	 opportunities.	 In	 fact,	 the	 impacts	 and	
productivity	of	 infrastructure	will	 often	be	highest	 in	 lagging	 regions.	 Laos,	 in	particular,	 stands	 to	
gain	much	from	improved	infrastructure	and	connections	to	ports	since	transport	costs	are	often	far	
higher	in	landlocked	countries.	Across	ASEAN	members,	the	well-developed	infrastructure	in	coastal	
areas	must	be	complemented	with	investments	in	remote	and	inland	locations.	
This	chapter	identifies	three	main	channels	through	which	physical	infrastructure	can	contribute	to	
narrowing	 the	development	gap.	Firstly,	 it	 can	 increase	 the	economic	growth	 rates	of	 the	poorest	
countries	and	regions.	Secondly,	 infrastructure	can	change	the	sectoral	distribution	of	growth	thus	
making	growth	more	pro-poor.	Thirdly	infrastructure	can	impact	on	poverty	and	measures	of	human	
well-being	directly.	Each	channel	is	discussed	in	turn.		
(i)	Infrastructure	increasing	economic	growth	in	lagging	regions	
Infrastructure	 can	 spur	 the	 rate	 of	 economic	 growth	 in	 a	 number	 of	 different	 ways	 including	
improving	access	to	the	key	 factors	of	production,	 linking	markets,	allowing	for	 the	exploitation	of	
economies	of	scale,	expanding	productive	capacity,	reducing	the	costs	of	production	and	the	costs	of	
doing	 business,	 and	 increasing	 productivity	 and	 competitiveness.	 It	 can	 increase	 efficiency	 by	
promoting	the	agglomeration	of	businesses,	leading	to	knowledge	spillovers,	ensuring	producers	can	
respond	quickly	to	changes	in	demand	and	facilitating	the	movement	of	people	to	the	most	suitable	
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jobs.	 Infrastructure	can	also	 facilitate	 intra	and	extra	 regional	 trade	by	providing	greater	access	 to	
different	 markets	 and	 good	 infrastructure	 will	 also	 attract	 both	 domestic	 and	 Foreign	 Direct	
Investment	 (FDI),	which	 are	 important	 drivers	 of	 growth.	 Access	 to	 safe	water	 and	 sanitation	 are	
needed	for	a	healthy	workforce	and	increases	in	labour	productivity.	Reliable	supplies	of	electricity	
allow	businesses	to	operate	without	disruption	while	good	telecommunications	enables	businesses	
to	make	 informed	 decisions	 based	 on	 the	 latest	 available	 relevant	 information	 (see	 for	 example,	
DfID,	2002,	Bhattacharyay,	2009,	Brooks	et	al.,	2010	and	WEF,	2011).		
Further,	 Serven	 and	 Calderon	 (2004)	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 improved	 infrastructure	 as	 a	
precursor	 for	 trade	 liberalisation	 and	 integration	 to	 achieve	 the	 desired	 impacts	 on	 growth	 and	
development.	 	 In	order	to	narrow	development	gaps,	however,	 it	 is	necessary	for	 infrastructure	to	
promote	growth	in	lagging	regions	or	at	least	provide	those	living	in	such	regions	greater	access	to	
income	 earning	 opportunities	 thus	 allowing	 them	 to	 participate	more	 fully	 in	 the	 growth	 process	
(OECD,	2007).		
(ii)	Infrastructure	changing	the	sectoral	pattern	of	growth	
Physical	infrastructure	can	also	promote	pro-poor	growth	and	reduce	development	gaps	by	changing	
the	sectoral	distribution	of	economic	growth.	For	example,	many	of	the	poor	in	AMS	are	located	in	
rural	 areas	 and	 are	 reliant	 on	 agriculture	 for	 a	 living.	 Infrastructure	 projects	 which	 are	 biased	
towards	production	in	this	sector	will	therefore	have	the	greatest	impact	on	poverty	and	gaps	within	
and	 across	ASEAN	members	will	 be	 reduced.	 Rural	 roads,	 improved	 storage	 facilities,	 irrigation	 as	
well	 as	 telecommunications	 assisting	 farmers	 in	 accessing	 information	on	 the	 latest	market	 prices	
can	assist	 in	 increasing	productivity	and	output	 in	 the	agricultural	 sector	 (DfID,	2006).	 In	 changing	
the	 sectoral	 pattern	 of	 growth,	 infrastructure	 can	 increase	 the	 poverty	 elasticity	 of	 growth,	 with	
each	percentage	 increase	 in	GDP	per	 capita	 leading	 to	 greater	 reduction	 in	 the	percentage	of	 the	
population	living	in	income	poverty.		
(iii)	The	direct	impact	of	physical	infrastructure	on	poverty	and	human	well-being	
There	 are	 several	 direct	 channels	 through	 which	 physical	 infrastructure	 can	 impact	 on	 poverty	
reduction	 and	 improvements	 in	 human	well-being.	 Firstly,	 physical	 infrastructure	 investments	 can	
directly	 create	 employment	opportunities	 for	 the	poor	 through	 its	 construction	 and	maintenance.	
Secondly,	 infrastructure	 can	 provide	 better	 access	 to	 employment	 opportunities,	 by	 reducing	 the	
travel	time	to	other	areas	and	by	linking	different	markets.	Thirdly,	the	poor	can	benefit	further	by	
the	 improved	 access	 to	 markets	 and	 basic	 services	 that	 infrastructure	 provides.	 For	 example,	
infrastructure	 will	 enable	 poor	 communities	 to	 sell	 their	 produce	 at	 local	 markets	 as	 well	 as	
purchasing	 goods	at	potentially	 cheaper	prices.	 They	will	 also	be	better	 able	 to	 access	health	 and	
education	 services,	 either	 through	 reduced	 travel	 time	 or	 by	 being	 able	 to	 travel	 to	 schools	 and	
health	 clinics	 that	 were	 previously	 out	 of	 reach	 (DfID,	 2002,	 Bhattacharyay,	 2009).	 By	 having	 a	
greater	 impact	 on	 the	 poor,	 infrastructure	 can	 reduce	 inequality	 within	 and	 across	 countries	
(Estache,	 2003;	 World	 Bank,	 2003).	 Infrastructure	 can	 also	 have	 a	 direct	 impact	 on	 poverty	 by	
reducing	the	prices	that	the	poor	pay	for	their	utilities	and	therefore	raising	their	real	income	(ADB,	
2012).	
In	 fact,	 improvements	 in	physical	 infrastructure	 are	widely	 viewed	as	 crucial	 for	 progress	 towards	
the	 United	 Nations	Millennium	 Development	 Goals	 (MDGs).	 The	MDGs	 are	 a	 set	 of	 international	
development	 goals	 to	which	 all	 United	Nations	member	 countries	 are	 committed	 to	 achieving	 by	
2015.	The	MDG	target	of	 reducing	 the	proportion	of	 the	population	without	 sustainable	access	 to	
safe	drinking	water	and	basic	 sanitation	 relates	directly	 to	 the	provision	of	physical	 infrastructure.	
Improving	 access	 to	water	will	 also	 have	 a	 number	 of	 other	 benefits	which	 can	 assist	 in	 reducing	
development	 gaps.	 For	 example,	 access	 to	 water	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 health	 but	 is	 also	
important	 to	 agriculture	 with	 irrigation	 leading	 to	 higher	 agricultural	 productivity	 which	 can	 help	
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improve	food	security	and	reduce	the	vulnerability	of	 rural	households	 (DfID,	2006).	 Infrastructure	
can	therefore	contribute	to	progress	towards	all	MDGs.	As	noted	above,	transport	infrastructure	in	
particular,	will	assist	in	reducing	income	poverty	by	providing	people	with	greater	access	to	income	
earning	opportunities,	as	well	as	reducing	the	costs	and	 improving	access	to	schools,	health	clinics	
and	hospitals,	all	of	which	directly	 impact	on	school	attendance,	 child	and	maternal	mortality	and	
other	MDGs	 (see	Willoughby,	 2004a).	 Energy	 infrastructure	 is	 also	 crucial.	 The	World	Bank	 (2011)	
argues	 that	access	 to	modern	sources	of	energy	 is	vital	 in	providing	households	access	 to	modern	
cooking	solutions,	which	can	 	 improve	health	and	reduce	rates	of	premature	mortality	particularly	
for	women	and	children.	
Gender	 gaps	 and	 inequities	 can	 also	 be	 reduced	 through	 improved	 infrastructure.	 A	 lack	 of	
infrastructure	in	rural	areas	 implies	women	spend	a	 lot	of	time	accessing	water	and	basic	services,	
travelling	to	markets	and	collecting	firewood	for	cooking	and	heating.	Rural	 infrastructure	projects	
(including	improved	access	to	electricity)	can	benefit	women	through	employment,	 improving	their	
access	to	services,	improving	their	health,	reducing	their	burden	of	work	in	the	home	and	freeing	up	
more	time	for	other	productive	work	and	education	(ILO,	2010;	OECD,	2011).	
Infrastructure	can	also	contribute	to	environmental	sustainability.	It	can	do	so	by	providing	access	to	
clean	water	and	sanitation,	cleaner	sources	of	energy,	the	safe	management	and	disposal	of	waste,	
and	the	management	of	traffic	in	urban	areas	(World	Bank,	1994).	By	contributing	to	environmental	
sustainability,	 infrastructure	 can	 assist	 in	 ensuring	 that	 a	 narrowing	 of	 the	 development	 gap	 will	
prevail	in	the	future.	Good	systems	of	infrastructure	can	also	assist	countries	in	adjusting	to	climate	
change	and	coping	with	natural	disasters	(ADB,	2012).	
Despite	the	numerous	potential	benefits	arising	from	physical	infrastructure,	positive	impacts	should	
not	 be	 taken	 for	 granted.	 There	 are	 often	 environmental	 (and	 social)	 costs	 of	 large	 scale	
infrastructure	 projects.	 Importantly,	 by	 facilitating	 economic	 activity	 in	 some	 regions	 relative	 to	
others,	infrastructure	can	potentially	increase	inequality	and	widen	the	development	gap	within	and	
across	countries.	Even	in	rural	or	 lagging	regions,	the	increased	competition	induced	my	improving	
access	to	markets	might	actually	harm	some	producers	and	affect	local	production	in	the	short	term	
(Stafford,	2005).		
Environmental	 impacts	 from	 infrastructure	 projects	 include	 carbon	 emissions,	 water	 and	 air	
pollution,	 flooding	 and	 deforestation;	 these	 impacts	 are	 often	 disproportionately	 felt	 by	 the	 poor	
(World	 Bank,	 2007).	 This	 is	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 social	 impacts	 arising	 from	 the	 displacement	 of	
communities.	It	is	also	true	that	infrastructure	alone	will	often	be	insufficient	to	reduce	poverty	and	
development	 gaps.	 Complementary	 interventions	 are	 required	 such	 as	 raising	 the	 level	 of	 human	
capital	 of	 the	 poor	 to	 allow	 them	 to	 make	 use	 of	 the	 increased	 employment	 opportunities	 that	
infrastructure	brings.	The	ADB	(2012a)	documents	empirical	evidence	that	shows	that	infrastructure	
is	 more	 successful	 at	 reducing	 poverty	 when	 accompanied	 by	 strong	 programs	 in	 health	 and	
education.	Moreover,	 improving	 the	 investment	 environment	will	 also	 be	 important	 for	 improved	
infrastructure	to	attract	domestic	and	foreign	firms	and	improve	employment	opportunities	for	the	
poor.	 Governments	must	 also	 play	 the	 important	 role	 of	 providing	 basic	 services	 for	 the	 poor	 to	
access	(Stafford,	2005).	
Since,	physical	 infrastructure	developments	potentially	have	both	positive	and	negative	impacts	on	
development	and	poverty,	 its	 influence	on	development	and	narrowing	the	development	gap	is	an	
empirical	issue.	We	therefore	now	turn	to	the	empirical	evidence	of	the	impacts	of	infrastructure.		
4.2.5.	Empirical	evidence	of	the	impact	of	infrastructure	on	development	
During	the	past	two	decades	a	vast	number	of	studies	have	been	undertaken	to	evaluate	the	impact	
of	 infrastructure	on	 indicators	of	development	 including	output,	growth,	productivity,	poverty	and	
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inequality.	 Studies	differ	 through	 their	measure	of	 infrastructure,	 their	 empirical	 techniques,	 their	
time	 periods,	 their	 sample	 of	 countries	 and	 their	 model	 specifications.3	 Extensive	 reviews	 of	 the	
literature	are	provided	by	Gramlich	(1994),	Calderon	and	Serven	(2004),	Estache	(2006),	Romp	and	
de	 Haan	 (2007)	 and	 Straub	 (2008).	 This	 chapter	 identifies	 four	 stylised	 facts	 from	 this	 extensive	
literature.	
(i).	Macroeconomic	 studies	 confirm	a	positive	association	between	 infrastructure	and	development	
but	the	precise	magnitude	of	the	effect	is	disputed		
Results	 from	 studies	 examining	 the	 impact	 of	 infrastructure	 on	 output,	 economic	 growth	 and	
productivity	generally	conclude	that	infrastructure	is	important	(for	thorough	reviews	see	Calderon	
and	 Serven,	 2004;	 Romp	 and	 de	 Haan,	 2005;	 UN-HABITAT,	 2011).	 However,	 the	 finding	 is	 by	 no	
means	 universal	 and	 obtaining	 precise	 estimates	 of	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 impact	 has	 not	 been	
possible.	Some	studies	find	infrastructure	has	an	implausibly	high	rate	of	return	while	others	find	it	
has	a	negligible	impact.	For	example,	Straub	(2008)	reviews	the	findings	from	140	specifications	from	
64	 papers	 published	 between	 1989	 and	 2007	 and	 finds	 that	 63	 per	 cent	 of	 specifications	 find	 a	
positive	and	significant	association	between	infrastructure	and	a	development	outcome,	31	per	cent	
find	no	significant	association	and	six	per	cent	find	a	negative	and	significant	relationship.	
Empirical	studies	stem	from	the	work	of	Aschauer	(1989).	In	this	seminal	study,	he	found	that	a	one	
per	cent	increase	in	the	level	of	US	public	infrastructure	is	associated	with	a	0.39	per	cent	change	in	
output.	 A	 finding	 of	 similar	 magnitude	 for	 the	 US	 is	 reported	 by	 Munnell	 (1990)	 although	 the	
arguably	 unrealistic	 magnitude	 of	 the	 impact	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	 re-examinations	 of	 the	
infrastructure	output	relationship	with	other	studies	disputing	the	size	of	the	effect	 (see	Gramlich,	
1994;	Holtz-Eakin,	1994).	
While	earlier	studies	examined	the	impact	of	 infrastructure	using	time-series	data	for	the	US,	 later	
studies	use	cross-country	data.	Canning	(1999)	confirms	a	positive	association	between	investment	
and	output	using	a	large	sample	of	countries.	Further,	using	data	for	over	100	countries	spanning	the	
period	1960	to	2000,	Calderon	and	Serven	(2004)	find	that	both	the	stock	of	 infrastructure	and	 its	
quality	 have	 large	 impacts	 on	 per	 capita	 economic	 growth	 as	well	 as	 reducing	 income	 inequality.	
Other	 studies	 confirming	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 measures	 of	 infrastructure	 and	 growth	
include	Esfahani	and	Ramires	(2003)	and	Sanchez-Robles	(1998).		
Other	 studies	have	examined	 the	 impact	of	 specific	 types	of	physical	 infrastructure,	 again,	usually	
with	 encouraging	 findings.	 These	 studies	 are	 often	 focused	 on	 the	 US	 or	 OECD	 countries.	 For	
example,	Cronin	et	al.	(1991)	confirm	that	spending	on	telecommunications	has	led	to	higher	output	
in	 the	 US	 and	 Röller	 and	 Waverman	 (2001)	 find	 large	 output	 effects	 of	 telecommunications	
infrastructure	 in	 OECD	 countries.	More	 recently,	 Czernich	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 find	 that	 a	 10	 percentage	
point	 increase	 in	 broadband	 penetration	 raised	 annual	 per	 capita	 growth	 by	 0.9	 -	 1.5	 percentage	
points	in	OECD	countries	during	the	period	1996	to	2007.	Easterly	and	Rebelo	(1993)	find	that	public	
spending	 on	 transport	 and	 communications	 is	 positively	 associated	 with	 economic	 growth	 while	
Fernald	 (1999)	 finds	 large	 productivity	 effects	 of	 changes	 in	 road	 infrastructure	 in	 the	US.	UNIDO	
(2009a)	 find	 evidence	 that	 energy	 infrastructure	 is	 important	 for	 economic	 growth.	Moreover,	 in	
reviewing	studies	of	the	impacts	of	specific	types	of	physical	capital,	Estache	(2006)	finds	economic	
returns	on	investment	projects	averaging	30	to	40	per	cent	for	telecommunications,	in	excess	of	40	
																																								 																				
3	The	approach	of	the	macroeconomic	empirical	studies	is	often	to	estimate	some	kind	of	production	function,	
often	for	a	country	or	regions	within	a	country	but	sometimes	using	cross-country	data.	Unfortunately,	there	
are	very	 few	studies	 specific	 to	ASEAN	countries	and	 the	 focus	of	 this	 review	 is	 therefore	 the	cross-country	
literature.	Models	are	estimated	using	a	regression	framework	or	a	growth	accounting	approach.		The	stock	of	
infrastructure	 per	 capita	 is	 usually	 used	 as	 the	 measure	 of	 infrastructure	 often	 just	 capturing	 public	
infrastructure,	although	specific	types	or	categories	of	physical	infrastructure	are	sometimes	examined.	
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per	cent	for	electricity	generation	and	as	much	as	200	per	cent	for	roads	(Estache,	2006,	pp.8).	This	
indicates	that	the	provision	of	roads	is	likely	to	take	priority	for	some	countries,	particularly	in	rural	
areas.		
However,	 not	 all	 studies	 establish	 a	 positive	 association	 between	 infrastructure	 and	 growth.	 One	
exception	 is	 Devarajan	 et	 al.	 (1996)	 who	 find	 a	 negative	 association	 between	 the	 share	 of	
infrastructure	 spending	 in	 total	 spending	 and	 economic	 growth	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Their	
explanation	 for	 this	 finding	 is	 that	 high	 levels	 of	 infrastructure	 spending	 can	 actually	 become	
unproductive,	 with	 overprovision	 of	 infrastructure	 in	 some	 countries	 driving	 this	 result.	 	 Further,	
Straub	et	al.	(2008)	fail	to	find	any	link	between	infrastructure,	productivity	and	growth	in	East	Asia	
and	suggest	that	the	main	role	of	 infrastructure	was	to	relieve	existing	constraints	and	bottlenecks	
rather	than	directly	encouraging	growth.	These	studies	point	to	the	possible	existence	of	an	optimal	
level	of	infrastructure.	
Hulten	(1996)	provides	evidence	that	the	efficiency	of	 infrastructure,	 in	addition	to	 its	 level	 is	very	
important	in	explaining	differences	in	growth	rates	across	countries.4	The	study	finds	that	over	one-
quarter	of	the	difference	 in	the	growth	rate	between	Africa	and	East	Asia	can	be	attributed	to	the	
difference	 in	 the	effective	use	of	 infrastructure	 resources.	 This	 study	highlights	 the	 importance	of	
soft	infrastructure	examined	in	Section	4.3.	
(ii).	 Positive	 impacts	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	 found	 in	macroeconomic	 studies	 examining	 developing	
countries	
It	is	unlikely	that	the	impact	of	infrastructure	is	the	same	across	all	countries,	an	assumption	made	
by	 much	 of	 the	 cross-country	 literature.	 In	 their	 review	 of	 macroeconomic	 studies,	 Briceno-
Garmendia	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 Calderon	 and	 Servon	 (2004)	 and	 Estache	 (2006)	 find	 that	 infrastructure	
matters	more	in	low-income	countries	and	regions	than	in	richer	ones.	Further,	Straub	(2008)	finds	
that	 results	 are	 slightly	 more	 positive	 when	 studies	 are	 restricted	 to	 those	 using	 data	 for	 just	
developing	 countries,	 confirming	 the	 notion	 that	 returns	 to	 infrastructure	 can	 be	 higher	 in	 such	
countries.	 Hulten	 and	 Isaksson	 (2007)	 explicitly	 test	 whether	 the	 impacts	 of	 infrastructure	 vary	
according	to	the	level	of	development,	measured	by	a	countries’	World	Bank	income	classification.	
Their	 results	 confirm	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 infrastructure	 on	 productivity	 is	 higher	 for	 lower	 income	
countries.	UNIDO	(2009b)	also	find	that	the	returns	to	public	investment	are,	largely,	diminishing	as	
income	increases.	
De	la	Fuente	and	Estache	(2004)	review	12	studies	which	have	examined	the	impact	of	infrastructure	
and	growth	in	individual	developing	countries	and	find	that	all	of	them	report	positive	associations.	
The	evidence	indicates	that	infrastructure	can	play	an	important	role	in	narrowing	the	development	
gap	 between	 rich	 and	 poor	 countries,	 with	 returns	 to	 infrastructure	 investment	 probably	 being	
highest	in	the	early	stages	of	development	where	basic	infrastructure	is	absent.	
(iii).	While	there	is	evidence	that	infrastructure	benefits	the	poor,	such	impacts	should	not	be	taken	
for	granted		
There	is	no	shortage	of	evidence	of	infrastructure	leading	to	reductions	in	the	incidence	of	poverty,	
the	 level	 of	 inequality	 and	 improvements	 in	 human	 well-being.	 	 Numerous	 examples	 and	 case	
studies	 are	 provided	 by	 OECD	 (2007)	 and	 UN-HABITAT	 (2011).	 However,	 the	 benefits	 of	
infrastructure	 to	 the	poor	 should	by	no	means	be	 taken	 for	 granted.	While	 infrastructure	has	 the	
potential	to	assist	the	poor	by	connecting	them	to	economic	opportunities	and	reducing	production	
and	 transportation	 costs,	 its	 impact	 depends	 upon	 the	 poor	 gaining	 access	 to	 appropriate	
																																								 																				
4	Infrastructure	efficiency	is	estimated	using	an	index	incorporating	information	on	the	faulty	telephone	lines,	
electricity	generation	losses,	paved	roads	and	diesel	locomotive	availability.		
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infrastructure	 as	 well	 as	 it	 being	 affordable	 to	 the	 poor.	 Poverty	 reduction	 depends	 upon	 many	
different	interventions	and	factors	of	which	infrastructure	is	just	one.	
For	example,	 in	their	study	of	child	health	outcomes,	Leipziger	et	al.	(2003)	find	that	in	addition	to	
traditional	variables	such	as	income,	assets,	education	and	direct	health	intervention,	access	to	basic	
infrastructure	 services	 is	 also	 very	 important.	 According	 to	 the	 study,	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 the	
difference	 in	 health	outcomes	between	 the	 rich	 and	poor	 can	be	 explained	by	 access	 to	 services.	
They	 conclude	 that	 the	 best	 progress	 towards	 the	 MDGs	 will	 be	 made	 through	 combining	
complementary	 interventions	given	 that	many	of	 the	goals	are	 inter-related.	Clearly	 infrastructure	
can	complement	other	direct	 interventions	 in	the	health	and	education	sectors	to	 improve	human	
development.	 Brenneman	 and	 Kerf	 (2002)	 also	 review	 the	 literature	 to	 uncover	 important	 links	
between	infrastructure	and	improved	health	and	education	outcomes.	Specifically	they	discuss	the	
links	between	access	to	transport,	electricity	and	water	and	improvements	in	health	and	education	
and	how	they	are	 inter-related.5	Further,	using	cross-country	data,	Lopez	 (2003)	and	Calderon	and	
Serven	(2008)	find	that	infrastructure	(measured	using	telephone	density)	is	associated	with	reduced	
income	inequality.	
The	World	Bank	(1994;	2008)	finds	however,	that	public	infrastructure	benefits	the	non-poor	more	
than	the	poor	and	warns	against	the	negative	 impacts	that	 infrastructure	projects	can	have	on	the	
poor	through	displacement	and	environmental	degradation	discussed	above.		
(iv).	The	empirical	literature	is	limited	in	its	policy	relevance	
While	useful	in	demonstrating	the	positive	impacts	of	physical	infrastructure,	the	empirical	literature	
can	only	provide	very	 limited	 insights	 into	a	number	of	useful	questions	from	a	policy	perspective.	
Straub	 (2008)	 notes	 that	 important	 questions	 remain	 over	 the	 relevance	 of	 infrastructure	 to	
countries	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 development	 and	 its	 role	 in	 creating	 or	 closing	 the	 gap	 between	
regions	within	and	across	countries	and	among	rural	and	urban	areas.	Different	levels	and	patterns	
of	infrastructure	spending	should	be	undertaken	at	different	stages	of	development.		
While	 it	 is	 true	 that	most	 empirical	 studies	 find	 a	 positive	 association	between	 infrastructure	 and	
development,	 this	 literature	 has	 limited	 information	 for	 policy	 makers	 of	 what	 forms	 of	
infrastructure	 have	 the	 greatest	 returns	 and	 should	 take	 priority	 and	 where	 projects	 should	 be	
undertaken.	Exceptions	include	Estache	(2006)	and	the	empirical	studies	of	Fan	et	al.,	(1999;	2002)	
which	showed	that	spending	on	roads	has	the	biggest	 impact	on	poverty	relative	to	other	types	of	
infrastructure	spending	in	the	context	of	India	and	China.				
Further,	 the	 literature	 is	 not	 always	 clear	 on	 how	 infrastructure	 has	 led	 to	 growth	when	 positive	
associations	are	obtained.	Different	countries	with	different	characteristics	require	different	types	of	
																																								 																				
5	 There	 is	 very	 little	 literature	 which	 examines	 the	 link	 between	 infrastructure	 and	 poverty	 specifically	 in	
ASEAN	 countries.	 However,	Willoughby	 (2004b)	 documents	 the	 important	 role	 that	 infrastructure	 played	 in	
reducing	poverty	 in	Vietnam	during	 the	1990s.	The	government	 invested	greatly	 in	 transport,	power,	water,	
irrigation	and	telecommunications,	successfully,	attracting	FDI	leading	to	private	sector	job	creation.	Studies	by	
Glewwe	et	al.	 (2002)	and	Balisican	et	al.	 (2003)	emphasise	 the	 importance	of	 roads	and	 improved	access	 to	
services	greatly	assisted	 in	 reducing	poverty	 in	Vietnam.	Balisacan	and	Pernia	 (2003)	 find	that	 investment	 in	
roads	in	the	Philippines	reduces	poverty	in	areas	with	higher	levels	of	schooling.	Gibson	and	Olivia	(201)	find	
that	 access	 to	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 infrastructure	 (roads	 and	 electricity)	 is	 important	 for	 rural	 households	 in	
Indonesia.	
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infrastructure	and	at	different	times.		There	are	also	questions	over	sequencing	that	countries	must	
consider	in	their	infrastructure	policies.		
4.	3.	Institutional	Connectivity	and	Narrowing	the	Development	Gap	
4.3.1	What	is	Institutional	Infrastructure?	
Institutional	connectivity	relates	to	‘soft	infrastructure’	or	the	rules	and	institutions	that	facilitate	or	
support	 the	 development	 and	 operation	 of	 hard	 infrastructure	 (ADB,	 2009,	 2012;	 Bhattacharyay,	
2009).	 Soft	 infrastructure	 therefore	 includes	 aspects	 of	 governance	 (including	 the	 policy,	
institutional,	 legal	 and	 judicial	 environments),	 the	 protection	 of	 property	 rights,	 financial	 and	
accounting	 systems,	 the	 labour	 force	 and	 can	 also	 include	 ‘social	 infrastructure’	 (such	 as	 health,	
education,	 law	 and	 order,	 community	 development)	 (Casey,	 2005;	 Bhattacharyay,	 2009).	 Soft	
infrastructure	 therefore	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 increasing	 economic	 growth	 and	 productivity,	
reducing	poverty	and	narrowing	the	development	gap	among	ASEAN	members.	Without	adequate	
soft	infrastructure,	the	impact	of	hard/physical	infrastructure	will	be	very	limited.	
ASEAN	(2011)	includes	the	following	institutional	barriers	to	ASEAN	integration:	tariff	and	non-tariff	
barriers;	 differing	 standards;	 and	 burdensome	 processes	 and	 procedures	 for	 the	 movement	 of	
goods,	services	and	people.	Further,	Brooks	(2008)	argues	that	“high	freight	costs,	delays	in	customs	
clearance,	 unofficial	 payment	 solicitations,	 slow	 port	 loading	 or	 landing	 and	 handling,	 and	 poor	
governance	 create	 barriers	 to	 trade.	 Institutional	 bottleneck	 (administrative,	 legal,	 financial,	
regulatory,	 and	 other	 logistics	 infrastructure),	 information	 asymmetries,	 and	 discretionary	 powers	
that	give	rise	to	rent	seeking	activities	by	government	officials	at	various	steps	of	trade	transactions	
also	 impose	 costs”	 (Brooks,	 2008,	 pp.4).	 Improvements	 in	 these	 forms	 of	 soft	 infrastructure	 are	
needed	to	reduce	the	transaction	costs	of	doing	business	and	to	complement	improvements	in	the	
hard	or	physical	infrastructure	in	fostering	economic	growth.		
The	 ADB	 (2012a)	 summarises	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 shows	 that	 customs,	 immigration,	
quarantine	and	security	policies	can	all	impede	trade	and	growth	and	that	improving	these	policies	
will	be	important	for	narrowing	the	development	gap.	The	study	emphasises	the	importance	of	soft	
infrastructure	in	complementing	hard	infrastructure.	For	example,	roads	won’t	be	used	effectively	if	
border	 crossing	 are	 too	 onerous,	 tourists	 won’t	 travel	 with	 uncertain	 immigration	 rules	 and	
processes,	and	cargo	won’t	be	moved	if	tariffs	are	too	high.		
4.3.2	The	relationship	between	institutional	infrastructure	and	development	
Similar	to	the	relationship	between	physical	infrastructure	and	development	provided	in	Section	4.2,	
there	are	strong	associations	between	development	indicators	and	measures	of	soft	infrastructure.		
Figures	 4.7	 to	 4.12	 provide	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 HDI	 and	 three	 measures	 of	 soft	
infrastructure:	governance;	the	ease	of	doing	business	and	a	logistics	performance	index.		
Governance	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 composite	 index	 comprised	 of	 the	 following	 six	 equally	 weighted	
indicators	from	the	World	Bank:	(i)	control	of	corruption;	(ii)	government	effectiveness;	(iii)	political	
stability	 and	 absence	 of	 violence;	 (iv)	 regulatory	 quality;	 (v)	 rule	 of	 law;	 and	 (vi)	 voice	 and	
accountability.	 The	World	 Bank’s	 Ease	 of	 Doing	 Business	 rankings	 are	 based	 on	 a	 country’s	 score	
across	10	equally	weighted	components.6	The	logistics	performance	index	scores	countries	according	
to	the	ease	with	which	goods	can	be	transported	and	traded.	Scores	are	averaged	over	the	following	
six	dimensions:		(i)	the	efficiency	of	the	clearance	process	by	border	control	agencies;	(ii)	the	quality	
of	 trade	 and	 transport	 related	 infrastructure;	 (iii)	 the	 ease	 of	 arranging	 competitively	 priced	
																																								 																				
6	 These	 components	 include:	 (i)	 starting	 a	 business;	 (ii)	 dealing	 with	 construction	 permits;	 (iii)	 getting	
electricity;	(iv)	registering	property;	(v)	getting	credit;	(vi)	protecting	investors;	(vii)	paying	taxes;	(viii)	trading	
across	borders;	(ix)	enforcing	contracts;	and	(x)	resolving	insolvency.		
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shipments;	 (iv)	 the	 competence	 and	 quality	 of	 logistics	 services;	 (v)	 the	 ability	 to	 track	 and	 trace	
consignments;	and	(vi)	the	timeliness	of	shipments	 in	reaching	destination	within	the	scheduled	or	
expected	 delivery	 time.	 High	 scores	 for	 governance	 and	 	 logistics	 indicate	 a	 better	 performance	
while	lower	country	ranks	are	preferred	for	the	ease	of	doing	business.		
The	figures	provide	clear	positive	associations	between	improved	soft	infrastructure	and	the	level	of	
human	development.	A	stronger	relationship	between	the	ease	of	doing	business	appears	stronger	
in	countries	with	medium	levels	of	human	development	and	once	again	all	of	the	relationships	are	
particularly	 pronounced	 for	ASEAN	 countries.	 	 Similar	 relationships	 between	 the	measures	 of	 soft	
infrastructure	 and	GNI	 per	 capita	 (PPP)	 are	 provided	 in	 Figures	 A4.7	 to	 A4.12	 in	 the	 appendix.	 In	
summary,	there	is	strong	evidence	that	indicators	of	soft	infrastructure	and	development	are	highly	
correlated.		
	 	
	 18	
Figure	4.7:	Governance	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
	
Figure	4.8:	Governance	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
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Figure	4.9:	Ease	of	Doing	Business	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
Figure	4.10:	Ease	of	Doing	Business	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
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Figure	4.11:	Logistics	Performance	Index	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
	 	
Figure	4.12:	Logistics	Performance	Index	and	the	Human	Development	Index	(2010)	(ASEAN	
countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
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4.3.3	Institutional	Infrastructure	in	ASEAN	countries	
This	 section	 examines	 further	 indicators	 of	 soft	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 ASEAN	
countries.	 It	 compares	 scores	 and	 ranks	 for	 ASEAN	members	 across	 the	 following	 four	 groups	 of	
indicators:	 the	 quality	 of	 infrastructure;	 the	 ease	 of	 doing	 business;	 governance;	 and	 the	 logistics	
performance	 index.	 In	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 infrastructure	 varies	 considerable	 across	
ASEAN	 countries	 presenting	 a	 challenge	 for	 integration	 in	 general	 and	 for	 regional	 infrastructure	
development	more	specifically.	
Wong	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 provide	 the	 first	 ASEAN	 Competitiveness	 Report	 and	 find	 that	 while	 ASEAN	
competitiveness	is	above	the	world	average	and		improved	during	the	first	half	of	the	2000s,	it	has	
stagnated	over	the	past	five	years.	In	particular,	ASEAN	is	found	to	be	least	competitive	in	so	called	
administrative	 infrastructure	 relating	 to	 the	 time	 and	 procedures	 to	 start	 up	 a	 business	 and	 the	
efficiency	of	customs	procedures.	Improving	human	development	and	the	rule	of	law	are	also	found	
to	require	more	effort	among	some	AMS.		
Table	 4.2	 provides	 indicators	 of	 the	 quality	 of	 infrastructure	 for	 ASEAN	members	 from	 the	World	
Economic	Forum’s	Global	Competitiveness	 Index	 (GCI).7	The	score	and	rank	 for	 the	quality	of	each	
ASEAN	member’s	overall	infrastructure	for	2011-12	and	2008-09	are	provided	in	the	first	columns	of	
the	 table.	 The	 final	 row	of	 the	 table	 provides	 the	 average	 score	 and	 rank	 for	 ASEAN	members.	 It	
shows	that	 in	2011-12	ASEAN	would	rank	64	out	of	142	countries.	 	This	ranking	has	fallen	from	58	
over	 the	 last	 three	 years	 although	 only	 134	 countries	were	 included	 in	 2009-09.	 This	 provides	 an	
indication	that	ASEAN	has	experienced	very	limited	improvements	in	the	quality	of	its	infrastructure,	
constraining	great	integration	among	its	members.	 In	2011-12,	the	table	also	shows	that	individual	
country	rankings	vary	greatly	with	Singapore	ranked	2nd	out	of	142	countries	and	Brunei,	Malaysia	
and	Thailand	also	ranking	relatively	well.	However,	in	2011-12	Vietnam	ranked	123rd.		
There	are	large	gaps	in	the	scores	and	ranks	for	the	specific	infrastructure	quality	measures	among	
ASEAN	members	with	Singapore	and	Malaysia	scoring	and	ranking	very	highly	but	far	 lower	scores	
and	ranks	are	recorded	for	the	Philippines	and	Vietnam.	Brunei	and	Thailand	rank	relatively	well	and	
data	are	not	available	for	Laos	and	Myanmar.	Interestingly,	there	is	not	a	clear	quality	gap	between	
the	ASEAN	6	and	ASEAN	4	 for	which	data	are	available	with	Cambodia	often	having	better	 scores	
than	Indonesia	and	the	Philippines	across	the	different	measures	of	infrastructure	quality.	
With	 the	exception	of	Singapore	and	Thailand,	all	ASEAN	members	have	 improved	 their	quality	of	
their	 overall	 infrastructure	 scores	 although	 rankings	 have	 fallen	 for	 some	 countries	 due	 to	 the	
inclusion	 of	more	 countries	 in	 the	 later	 period	 and	 other	 countries	 improving	 the	 quality	 of	 their	
infrastructure	 at	 a	 faster	 rate.	 Indonesia	 and	 Cambodia	 have	 been	 particularly	 successful	 at	
improving	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 infrastructure	 in	 recent	 years	 although	 Cambodia’s	 poor	 quality	 of	
electricity	supply	lowers	its	overall	rank.	In	terms	of	the	overall	quality	of	infrastructure,	Brunei	ranks	
relatively	well	despite	ranking	relatively	poorly	for	its	quality	of	railroad	infrastructure.	Indonesia	has	
improved	its	score	and	rank	considerably,	but	still	ranks	poorly	on	the	quality	of	its	port	facilities	and	
the	country’s	electricity	supply	is	deemed	unreliable	as	well	as	scarce	(WEF,	2011).	
																																								 																				
7	The	GCI	 is	an	annual	 index	devised	by	the	World	Economic	Forum.	It	aggregates	data	on	110	variables	 into	
scores	 for	 twelve	 pillars	 capturing	 the	most	 important	 determinants	 of	 global	 competitiveness.	 The	 twelve	
pillars	include:	(i)	institutions;	(ii)	infrastructure;	(iii)	the	macroeconomic	environment;	(iv)	health	and	primary	
education;	 (v)	higher	education	and	training;	 (vi)	goods	market	efficiency;	 (vii)	 labour	market	efficiency;	 (viii)	
financial	market	 development;	 (ix)	 technological	 readiness;	 (x)	market	 size;	 (xi)	 business	 sophistication;	 and	
(xii)	 innovation.	The	index	recognises	that	determinants	of	productivity	differ	countries	at	different	stages	of	
development	and	therefore	groups	countries	according	to	whether	they	are	at	(i)	a	factor	driven	stage	(Stage	
1);	 (ii)	 a	 transition	 stage	 (from	Stage	 1	 to	 2);	 (iii)	 an	 efficiency	 driven	 stage	 (Stage	 2);	 (iv)	 a	 transition	 stage	
(from	Stage	2	to	3);	and	(v)	an	innovation	driven	stage	(Stage	3).			
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While	Vietnam	has	 improved	 its	 overall	 quality	 of	 infrastructure	 score,	 it	 ranks	 particularly	 poorly	
with	respect	to	the	quality	of	its	roads	and	port	infrastructure.	The	Philippines	has	also	improved	its	
score	but	from	a	low	base	and	still	doesn’t	feature	in	the	top	100	for	any	of	the	quality	rankings.	
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Table	4.2:	Soft	infrastructure	in	ASEAN	members	
	
Quality	of	Overall	
Infrastructure	Score	
2011-12	
Quality	of	Overall	
Infrastructure	Score	
2008-2009	 Quality	of	Roads	
Quality	of	Railroad	
Infrastructure	
Quality	of	Port	
Infrastructure	
Quality	of	Air	Transport	
Infrastructure	
Quality	of	electricity	
supply	
	 Score	
Rank	
(out	of	142)	 Score	
Rank	
(out	of	134)	 Score	 Rank	 Score	 Rank	 Score	 Rank	 Score	 Rank	 Score	 Rank	
ASEAN	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Brunei	 5	 44	 4.7	 39	 5.2	 33	 2.2	 85	 4.4	 60	 4.9	 62	 5.4	 53	
Indonesia	 3.9	 82	 2.8	 96	 3.5	 83	 3.1	 52	 3.6	 103	 4.4	 80	 3.7	 98	
Malaysia	 5.7	 23	 5.6	 19	 5.7	 18	 5	 18	 5.7	 15	 6	 20	 5.9	 38	
Philippines	 3.4	 113	 2.9	 94	 3.1	 100	 1.7	 101	 3	 123	 3.6	 115	 3.4	 104	
Singapore	 6.6	 2	 6.7	 2	 6.5	 2	 5.7	 7	 6.8	 1	 6.9	 1	 6.8	 4	
Thailand	 4.7	 47	 4.8	 35	 5	 37	 2.6	 63	 4.7	 47	 5.7	 32	 5.5	 50	
ASEAN	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cambodia	 4.1	 76	 3.1	 82	 4	 66	 1.8	 96	 4	 76	 4.3	 84	 3.5	 103	
Lao	PDR	 na	 na	 Na	 na	 Na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 Na	
Myanmar	 na	 na	 na	 na	 Na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 Na	
Viet	Nam	 3.1	 123	 2.7	 97	 2.6	 123	 2.5	 71	 3.4	 111	 4.1	 95	 3.3	 109	
ASEAN	
unweighted	
average	
4.6	 64	 4.2	 58	 4.5	 58	 3.1	 62	 4.5	 67	 5.0	 61	 4.7	 70	
Source:	WEF	(2008;	2011)	
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Table	4.3	provides	the	ease	of	doing	business	indicators	for	ASEAN	countries.	Data	are	available	for	
2010	and	2011	from	the	World	Bank	(2012).	The	last	row	of	the	table	indicates	that	if	ASEAN	was	a	
country	it	would	be	ranked	87	out	of	183	countries.	This	is	slightly	down	on	the	2010	ranking	of	86,	
highlighting	 the	need	 for	ASEAN	members	 to	make	progress	 in	 this	 respect.	 In	 comparison	 to	 the	
average	for	OECD	countries,	ASEAN	members	face	a	lower	cost	to	export	(US$742	versus	US$908	per	
container)	but	exporting	takes	considerably	longer	(19	versus	10	days)	(see	ADB,	2012).		
The	table	also	indicates	that	the	ease	of	doing	business	is	highest	in	Singapore	than	any	of	the	other	
183	 countries	 included	 in	 the	 rankings.	 Thailand	 and	 Malaysia	 also	 ranks	 well	 at	 17th	 and	 18th	
respectively.	 Lao	 PDR	 ranks	 the	 lowest	 among	 ASEAN	 members,	 at	 165	 out	 of	 183	 countries	
although	Myanmar	 is	 not	 included	 in	 the	 data.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 all	 ASEAN	 6	 countries	 rank	
higher	than	the	ASEAN	4.	Vietnam	ranks	higher	than	Indonesia	and	the	Philippines	which	have	very	
similar	ranks	to	Cambodia.	
Examining	the	individual	components	of	the	index	reveals	that	the	cost	of	exporting	and	importing	in	
Laos	is	significantly	higher	(about	four	times)	than	it	is	in	Singapore	and	Malaysia.	The	time	it	takes	
to	 import	and	export	for	Lao	is	also	substantially	higher.	 Interestingly,	Brunei	scores	 lowest	among	
ASEAN	members	when	it	comes	to	the	number	of	procedures	to	enforce	a	contract	and	joint	lowest	
with	 the	 Philippines	 when	 considering	 the	 number	 of	 procedures	 to	 start	 a	 business.	 These	
components	pull	down	the	country’s	overall	ease	of	doing	business	rank.	
With	 the	 exception	 of	 Singapore,	Malaysia	 and	 Thailand	 there	 is	 clearly	 greater	 scope	 for	 ASEAN	
members	 to	 improve	 the	 ease	 of	 doing	 business	 to	 encourage	 a	 flourishing	 private	 sector	 and	 to	
facilitate	greater	integration.	
Table	 4.4	 examines	 the	 ASEAN	 country	 ranks	 for	 the	World	 Bank’s	 governance	 indicators.	 It	 also	
examines	the	change	in	these	rankings	from	1996	(just	before	the	Asian	financial	crisis)	to	2010.	The	
final	two	rows	of	the	table	indicate	that	if	ASEAN	was	a	country	it	would	rank	about	halfway	for	most	
governance	indicators.	However,	ASEAN	has	fallen	in	rankings	across	all	governance	indicators	since	
1996	(although	more	countries	are	ranked	in	the	latter	period).	In	particular	there	are	large	falls	 in	
the	 rankings	 for	 “control	 of	 corruption’	 and	 ‘political	 stability	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 violence’.	 In	
general,	 Singapore	 and	 Brunei	 rank	 highly	 across	 the	 governance	 indicators	 although	 all	 ASEAN	
countries	rank	poorly	for	‘Voice	and	Accountability’.	 	 In	2010,	only	Brunei,	Malaysia,	Singapore	and	
Thailand	have	 ranks	 in	 the	 top	100	across	all	 governance	 indicators.	 Laos	and	Myanmar	are	often	
ranked	the	lowest	among	ASEAN	members	across	the	governance	indicators.	The	gap	between	the	
ASEAN	member	 rankings	 can	 be	 huge.	 The	 difference	 in	 ranks	 between	 Singapore	 and	Myanmar	
exceeds	200	for	‘Control	of	Corruption’,	‘Government	Effectiveness’	and	‘Regulatory	Quality’.	While	
there	is	generally	a	gap	between	the	ASEAN	6	and	the	ASEAN	4,	Vietnam	ranks	above	Indonesia	and	
the	Philippines	for	some	governance	indicators.		
Even	more	startling	 is	 the	change	 in	the	ranking	across	time.	Brunei	and	Singapore	 improved	their	
rank	on	just	two	governance	indicators	from	1996	to	2010	while	rankings	across	all	indicators	fell	for	
Lao	PDR,	Myanmar,	Philippines,	Thailand	and	Vietnam.		While	a	larger	number	of	countries	included	
in	the	sample	in	2010	can	partially	explain	this	finding,	there	is	strong	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	
perceived	level	of	governance	is	falling	in	ASEAN	countries.	
The	logistical	performance	index	scores	for	ASEAN	countries	are	shown	in	Table	4.5.	Once	again	the	
table	shows	that	is	ASEAN	is	treated	as	a	country,	its	ranking	for	the	overall	index	has	fallen	from	in	
62	 in	 2007	 (out	 of	 150	 countries)	 to	 68	 in	 2010	 (out	 of	 155	 countries).	 Singapore	 and	 Malaysia	
perform	very	well	 according	 to	 this	 index.	 The	 table	also	 indicates	 that	while	Cambodia,	 Laos	and	
Myanmar	always	score	less	than	the	ASEAN	6,	Vietnam	has	a	higher	overall	score	than	Indonesia	due	
to	its	higher	score	across	five	of	the	six	components	of	the	index.	
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Narrowing	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 logistics	 performance	 index	 across	 ASEAN	 members	 will	 be	
challenging.	 It	 will	 take	 time	 for	 the	 poor	 ASEAN	 countries	 to	 develop	 the	 capacity	 to	 reach	 the	
international	 best	 practice	 of	 a	 country	 like	 Singapore.	 However,	 the	 ASEAN	 Single	 Window	 for	
customs	clearance	 scheme	will	 greatly	assist	with	 trade	 facilitation	among	member	 countries.	 The	
ASEAN	 Single	 Window	 will	 integrate	 National	 Single	 Windows	 enabling	 a	 single	 submission	 of	
information	and	data	and	greatly	 speed	up	 the	customs	clearance	process.	Currently	 the	ASEAN	6	
has	a	Single	Window	system	in	place	with	the	ASEAN	4	to	establish	the	system	during	2012.		
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Table	4.3:	Ease	of	Doing	Business	Indicators	for	ASEAN	countries	(2011)	
	
Ease	of	doing	
business	index	
2011	(1=easiest	
to	183=most	
difficult)	
Ease	of	doing	
business	index	
2010	(1=easiest	
to	183=most	
difficult)	
Trade:	Cost	to	
export	(US$	per	
container)	
Trade:	Cost	to	
import	(US$	per	
container)	
Trade:	Time	
to	export	
(day)	
Trade:	
Time	to	
import	
(days)	
Trade:	
Documents	to	
export	
(number)	
Trade:	
Documents	to	
import	
(number)	
Procedures	
required	to	
start	a	business	
(number)	
Procedures	
required	to	
enforce	a	
contract	
(number)	
ASEAN	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Brunei	Darussalam	 83	 86	 680	 745	 19	 15	 6	 6	 15	 47	
Indonesia	 129	 126	 644	 660	 17	 27	 4	 7	 8	 40	
Malaysia	 18	 23	 450	 435	 17	 14	 6	 7	 4	 29	
Singapore	 1	 1	 456	 439	 5	 4	 4	 4	 3	 21	
Philippines	 136	 134	 630	 730	 15	 14	 7	 8	 15	 37	
Thailand	 17	 16	 625	 750	 14	 13	 5	 5	 5	 36	
ASEAN	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cambodia	 138	 138	 732	 872	 22	 26	 9	 10	 9	 44	
Lao	PDR	 165	 163	 1880	 2035	 44	 46	 9	 10	 7	 42	
Myanmar	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Vietnam	 98	 90	 580	 670	 22	 21	 6	 8	 9	 34	
ASEAN	Average	
(unweighted)	 87	 86	 742	 815	 19	 20	 6	 7	 8	 37	
Source:	World	Bank	(2012)	
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Table	4.4:	World	Bank	Governance	Indicators	for	ASEAN	countries	1996	and	2010	
	
Control	of	
Corruption	
Government	
Effectiveness	
Political	Stability	and	Absence	
of	Violence	 Regulatory	Quality	 Rule	of	Law	
Voice	and	
Accountability	
	
Rank	
(1996)	
Rank	
(2010)	
Rank	
(1996)	
Rank	
(2010)	 Rank	(1996)	 Rank	(2010)	
Rank	
(1996)	
Rank	
(2010)	
Rank	
(1996)	
Rank	
(2010)	
Rank	
(1996)	
Rank	
(2010)	
ASEAN	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Brunei	Darussalam	 53	 46	 34	 48	 20	 16	 13	 38	 55	 57	 136	 150	
Indonesia	 125	 153	 109	 110	 161	 173	 77	 127	 102	 146	 152	 110	
Malaysia	 54	 82	 45	 38	 66	 103	 57	 61	 54	 74	 92	 146	
Philippines	 90	 163	 93	 102	 125	 199	 71	 118	 86	 139	 83	 113	
Singapore	 8	 4	 1	 1	 23	 23	 1	 4	 24	 15	 79	 133	
Thailand	 92	 112	 69	 88	 73	 186	 75	 92	 56	 107	 75	 148	
ASEAN	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cambodia	 150	 194	 146	 163	 160	 158	 93	 136	 155	 185	 151	 160	
Lao	PDR	 120	 181	 129	 175	 76	 136	 164	 173	 142	 167	 156	 200	
Myanmar	 178	 209	 172	 205	 171	 189	 177	 208	 169	 205	 196	 210	
Vietnam	 109	 141	 117	 118	 72	 104	 133	 145	 108	 130	 167	 194	
ASEAN	unweighted	
average	
98	 129	 92	 105	 95	 129	 86	 110	 95	 123	 129	 156	
Ranked	out	of	 184	 210	 184	 210	 189	 213	 185	 210	 185	 212	 199	 212	
Source:	World	Bank	(2012)	
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Table	4.5:	Logistics	Performance	Index	values	for	ASEAN	members	2010	
	
Logistics	
performance	
index:	Overall		
(1=low	to	
5=high)	
Rank	
2010	
(out	of	
155)	
	
Rank	
2007	
(out	of	
150)	
Logistics	
performance	index:	
Ability	to	track	and	
trace	consignments	
(1=low	to	5=high)	
Logistics	performance	
index:	Competence	
and	quality	of	logistics	
services	(1=low	to	
5=high)	
Logistics	performance	
index:	Ease	of	arranging	
competitively	priced	
shipments	(1=low	to	
5=high)	
Logistics	performance	
index:	Efficiency	of	
customs	clearance	
process	(1=low	to	
5=high)	
Logistics	
performance	
index:	Frequency	
with	which	
shipments	reach	
consignee	within	
scheduled	or	
expected	time	
(1=low	to	5=high)	
Logistics	
performance	index:	
Quality	of	trade	and	
transport-related	
infrastructure	
(1=low	to	5=high)	
ASEAN	6	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Brunei	Darussalam	 Na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	
Indonesia	 2.76	 74	 42	 2.77	 2.47	 2.82	 2.43	 3.46	 2.54	
Malaysia	 3.44	 29	 26	 3.32	 3.34	 3.5	 3.11	 3.86	 3.5	
Philippines	 3.14	 43	 64	 3.29	 2.95	 3.4	 2.67	 3.83	 2.57	
Singapore	 4.09	 2	 1	 4.15	 4.12	 3.86	 4.02	 4.23	 4.22	
Thailand	 3.29	 34	 30	 3.41	 3.16	 3.27	 3.02	 3.73	 3.16	
ASEAN	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cambodia	 2.37	 128	 81	 2.5	 2.29	 2.19	 2.28	 2.84	 2.12	
Lao	PDR	 2.46	 118	 118	 2.45	 2.14	 2.7	 2.17	 3.23	 1.95	
Myanmar	 2.33	 131	 146	 2.36	 2.01	 2.37	 1.94	 3.29	 1.92	
Vietnam	 2.96	 52	 52	 3.1	 2.89	 3.04	 2.68	 3.44	 2.56	
ASEAN	unweighted	
average	
2.98	 68	 62	 3.04	 2.82	 3.02	 2.70	 3.55	 2.73	
Source:	World	Bank	(2012)	
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4.4	People-to-People	Connectivity	and	Narrowing	the	Development	Gap	
4.4.1	Cultural	and	educational	exchanges	and	tourism	
The	 objective	 of	 people-to-people	 connectivity	 in	 the	 Master	 Plan	 on	 ASEAN	 Connectivity	 is	 “To	
develop	 initiatives	 that	 promote	 and	 invest	 in	 education	 and	 life-long	 learning	 ,	 support	 human	
resource	 development,	 	 encourage	 innovation	 and	 entrepreneurship,	 promote	 ASEAN	 cultural	
exchanges,	and	promote	tourism	and	the	development	of	related	industries”	(ASEAN,	2011,	pp.7).	
The	 Master	 Plan	 includes	 a	 number	 of	 activities	 to	 achieve	 these	 objective	 including	 outreach	
programs,	student	exchanges,	reducing	visa	and	travel	requirements	and	education	programs	aimed	
at	fostering	a	greater	recognition	and	understanding	of	other	ASEAN	cultures.	ASEAN	has	a	number	
of	 established	 entities	 to	 assist	 in	 fulfilling	 these	 objectives	 including	 the	 ASEAN	 Socio-Cultural	
Community	 (ASCC),	 the	 ASEAN	 University	 Network	 (AUN),	 established	 in	 1995	 to	 promote	
collaboration	 among	 ASEAN	 Scholars	 and	 scientists,	 the	 ASEAN	 Committee	 for	 Culture	 and	
Information	and	the	ASEAN	Tourism	Strategic	Plan	2011-15	to	promote	tourism	and	increase	tourist	
arrivals	to	ASEAN.	
While	these	areas	of	people-to-people	connectivity	will	be	important	to	narrowing	the	development	
gap,	particularly	 in	the	long	term,	this	section	focuses	on	the	more	contentious	issue	of	people-to-
people	connectivity;	that	of	labour	mobility	and	migration.	
4.4.2	Intra	ASEAN	Labour	mobility	and	migration	
The	 free	 flow	 of	 labour	 is	 often	 viewed	 as	 a	 contentious	 issue	 of	 ASEAN	 integration	 and	 only	 an	
incremental	approach	 is	being	under	by	ASEAN	members.	Labour	movements	are	governed	by	the	
General	Agreement	on	Trade	and	Services	and	the	ASEAN	Framework	Agreement	on	Services	(AFAS).	
The	Framework	requires	countries	to	list	the	sectors	they	would	like	to	liberalise	and	there	has	been	
very	 limited	 commitment	 to	 liberalise	 further	 due	 to	 pressure	 from	 lobby	 groups	 (Manning	 and	
Bhatnagar,	 2005).	 Efforts	 are	 currently	 focused	 on	 improving	 skilled	 labour	 mobility.	 There	 is	
increasing	 movement	 of	 skilled	 workers	 within	 ASEAN,	 and	 this	 is	 associated	 with	 greater	 intra-
regional	 FDI	 and	 trade.	 However,	 unlike	 unskilled	 workers,	 an	 estimated	 80	 per	 cent	 of	 skilled	
workers	 come	 from	outside	of	ASEAN	 (Manning	 and	Bhatnagar,	 2005).	Menon	 (2012)	 argues	 that	
failure	to	deal	with	the	 issue	of	 labour	mobility	 is	the	biggest	disappointment	of	the	AEC	Blueprint	
and	there	are	currently	inadequate	policy	frameworks	for	dealing	with	labour	mobility.	
To	facilitate	greater	mobility	of	skilled	labour	among	its	members,	ASEAN	has	so	far	established	eight	
Mutual	Recognition	Arrangements	(MRAs).	These	MRAs	are	where	ASEAN	countries	recognise	each	
other’s	 conformity	 assessments	 therefore	 reducing	 time	 and	 costs	 in	 employment.	 They	 currently	
extend	to	the	following	eight	professional	groups:	 (i)	engineering;	 (ii)	nursing;	 (iii)	architecture;	 (iv)	
surveying;	 (v)	 tourism;	 (vi)	 medical	 practitioners;	 (vii)	 dental	 practitioners;	 and	 (viii)	 accountants	
(ASEAN,	2011).		
Some	ASEAN	countries	have	experienced	a	rapid	expansion	of	foreign	workers	to	very	high	levels.	In	
Malaysia	foreign	workers	increased	from	250,000	in	1990	to	more	than	two	million	in	2007	and	they	
accounted	 for	 16	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 countries	 labour	 force	 in	 2010.	More	 than	 two-third	 of	 foreign	
labour	is	from	ASEAN	countries,	in	particular,	workers	from	Indonesia		and	the	vast	majority	is	either	
skilled	or	semi-skilled	(Pasadilla,	2011).	
Thailand	has	a	huge	number	of	foreign	workers,	many	of	which	are	undocumented	and	experience	
exploitation.	There	are	an	estimated	 three	million	 foreign	workers	 in	Thailand	most	of	 them	 from	
Myanmar	 and	 smaller	 numbers	 from	 Laos	 and	 Cambodia	 yet	 they	 do	 not	 show	 up	 in	 the	 official	
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statistics.	The	Thai	government	has	embarked	on	a	scheme	to	register	foreign	workers	in	order	for	
them	 to	work	 legally	 and	 to	 access	 services.	However,	Myanmar	nationals	 are	 reluctant	 to	 return	
home,	 even	 temporarily,	 in	 order	 to	 get	 registered	 and	 therefore	 face	 possible	 arrest	 and	
deportation	 (Economist,	 2010).	 While	 the	 Philippines	 has	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 its	 population	
working	 overseas,	 the	 most	 common	 worker	 destinations	 are	 outside	 of	 ASEAN	 such	 as	 the	 US,	
Canada,	Australia,	Japan	and	the	Middles	East.		
Table	 4.6	 provides	 official	 data	 on	 intra-ASEAN	migration	 stocks	 from	 the	World	 Bank’s	 bilateral	
migration	 database.	 It	 provides	 data	 for	 1990	 and	 2010	 although	 data	 are	 not	 available	 for	
Indonesia,	Myanmar	and	Vietnam	for	the	latter	period.	The	table	demonstrates	a	fairly	high	level	of	
mobility	 among	 ASEAN	 members.	 It	 also	 indicates	 that	 the	 highest	 stocks	 of	 migrants	 are	
Indonesians	in	Malaysia	and	Malaysians	in	Singapore.	
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Table	4.6:	Intra	ASEAN	migrant	stocks	
1990	 To	
Brunei	
Darussalam	 Cambodia	 Indonesia	 Lao	PDR	 Malaysia	 Myanmar	 Philippines	 Singapore	 Thailand	 Vietnam	
From	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Brunei	Darussalam	 	 0	 3	 55	 0	 5,211	 19	 137	 322	 515	 20	
Cambodia	 	 0	 0	 994	 1,423	 106	 343	 254	 40	 10,882	 6	
Indonesia	 	 3,340	 58	 0	 57	 407,154	 4,121	 6,546	 37,770	 1007	 1,549	
Lao	PDR	 	 0	 141	 1,501	 0	 243	 518	 336	 19	 16,940	 8	
Malaysia	 	 40,846	 93	 3,471	 17	 0	 1,197	 1,042	 343,171	 1,153	 821	
Myanmar	 	 0	 28	 4,166	 412	 3,353	 0	 982	 293	 52,701	 29	
Philippines	 	 7,852	 83	 5,811	 28	 168,737	 2,003	 0	 747	 950	 647	
Singapore	 	 1,522	 66	 551	 3	 50,381	 190	 272	 0	 715	 186	
Thailand	 	 6,616	 16,276	 1,098	 2,318	 50,151	 378	 445	 3,846	 0	 213	
Vietnam	 	 6	 19,802	 6,995	 14,099	 6,313	 2,412	 1,709	 2,936	 4,857	 0	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2010	 To	
Brunei	
Darussalam	 Cambodia	 Indonesia	 Lao	PDR	 Malaysia	 Myanmar	 Philippines	 Singapore	 Thailand	 Vietnam	
From	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Brunei	Darussalam	 	 0	 0	 Na	 0	 7,905	 na	 1,003	 0	 0	 na	
Cambodia	 	 0	 0	 Na	 909	 0	 na	 232	 0	 49,750	 na	
Indonesia	 	 6,727	 505	 na	 0	 1,397,684	 na	 5,865	 102,332	 1,459	 na	
Lao	PDR	 	 0	 1,235	 na	 0	 0	 na	 0	 0	 77,443	 na	
Malaysia	 	 81,576	 816	 na	 0	 0	 na	 394	 1,060,628	 3,429	 na	
Myanmar	 	 0	 247	 na	 143	 17,034	 na	 415	 0	 288,487	 na	
Philippines	 	 15,861	 728	 na	 0	 277,444	 na	 0	 0	 3,360	 na	
Singapore	 	 3,033	 581	 na	 0	 103,318	 na	 288	 0	 2,134	 na	
Thailand	 	 13,381	 142,767	 na	 916	 79,604	 na	 150	 0	 0	 na	
Vietnam	 	 0	 173,694	 na	 8,167	 0	 na	 748	 0	 22,156	 na	
Source:	World	Bank	(2012)	adapted	from	Menon	(2012)	
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In	general,	unskilled	labour	is	dominated	by	females	in	domestic	services,	male	construction	workers	
and	 male	 agricultural	 workers.	 Skilled	 workers	 are	 concentrated	 in	 manufacturing	 and	 services	
(Manning	and	Bhatnagar,	2005).	The	asymmetrical	labour	mobility	between	AMSis	not	surprising,	as	
workers	 from	 poorer	 regions	 seek	 employment,	 higher	 wages	 and	 better	 working	 conditions	
elsewhere.	 A	 freer	movement	 of	 labour	 and	 people	 among	 ASEAN	 countries	 therefore	 has	 great	
potential	in	narrowing	the	development	gap.		Greater	labour	mobility	also	enables	migrants	to	send	
back	(remit)	money	to	their	home	countries.	In	areas	which	suffer	from	low	employment	rates	and	
limited	 income	 earning	 opportunities	 the	 benefits	will	 be	 particularly	 pronounced.	 Host	 countries	
also	 benefit	 from	 filling	 shortages	 and	 skills	 gaps	 in	 their	 labour	 force	 and	 businesses	 can	 benefit	
from	lower	wage	rates.							
A	rapidly	growing	 literature	 is	emerging	on	the	 impact	of	remittances	 in	receiving	countries.	While	
some	 findings	 are	 disputed,	 empirical	 studies	 find	 positive	 impacts	 with	 respect	 to	 growth	
(Catrinescu	 et	 al.,2009;	 Jongwanich,	 2007;	 Pradhan	 et	 al.,	 2008)),	 poverty	 reduction	 (Adams	 and	
Page,	 2005;	 Brown	 and	 Jiminez,	 2005),	 and	 raising	 levels	 of	 human	 capital	 (Hildebrandt	 and	
McKenzie,	2005;	Acosta	et	al.,	2007).	 	Table	4.7	below	demonstrates	that	 levels	of	remittances	are	
particularly	 high	 in	 the	 Philippines	 and	 Vietnam	 accounting	 for	 about	 11	 and	 8	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
countries’	 GDP	 respectively.	 This	 reflects	 the	 large	 number	 of	 national	 of	 these	 countries	 living	
abroad.	 	 The	 table	 also	 indicates	 that	 Brunei,	 Malaysia	 and	 Singapore	 have	 higher	 international	
migrant	stocks	(as	a	percentage	of	their	population)	reflecting	large	inflows	of	migrants,	from	ASEAN	
and	non-ASEAN	members,	in	order	to	meet	their	demand	for	labour.	
Despite	 its	 potential	 benefits	 the	 governments	 of	 both	 labour	 importing	 and	 exporting	 countries	
sometimes	oppose	move	towards	greater	labour	mobility.	The	governments	of	often	poorer	labour	
exporting	 countries	 have	 concerns	 over	 an	 exodus	 of	 talent	 and	 their	 skilled	 professionals.	 These	
impacts	 are	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 brain	 drain.	 	 The	 loss	 of	 doctors	 and	 nurses	 to	 richer	
countries	 with	 higher	 wages	 presents	 a	 particular	 concern.	 The	 governments	 of	 host	 (net	 labour	
importing)	countries	often	have	concerns	over	accepting	 large	numbers	of	unskilled	migrants	since	
this	can	lead	to	higher	unemployment	and	more	resources	required	for	social	protection.	It	can	also	
lead	to	social	tensions,	particularly	if	new	migrants	displace	domestic	workers.	Fewer	restrictions	on	
the	 movement	 of	 people	 also	 makes	 people	 trafficking	 easier.	 However,	 by	 restricting	 labour	
mobility	 to	 just	 skilled	 labour	 seriously	 restrict	 the	 ability	 to	 narrow	 the	 development	 gap.	
Restrictions	on	its	mobility	will	accentuate	inequality	and	makes	it	harder	for	all	ASEAN	countries	to	
adjust	to	changing	economic	and	demographic	circumstances	(Menon,	2012).	 It	 is	the	migration	of	
unskilled	 labour	 (even	 if	only	on	a	temporary	basis)	 than	will	be	of	most	benefit	 to	poor	countries	
and	regions	and	which	will	effectively	narrow	the	development	gap.		
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Table	4.7:	Remittances	and	the	stock	of	international	migrants	in	ASEAN	countries	(2010)		
	
Workers'	remittances	and	compensation	of	
employees,	received	(%	of	GDP)	
International	migrant	stock	(%	
of	population)	
Brunei	
Darussalam	 -	 37.1	
Cambodia	 3.3	 2.4	
Indonesia	 1.0	 0.1	
Lao	PDR	 0.6	 0.3	
Malaysia	 0.5	 8.3	
Myanmar	 -	 0.2	
Philippines	 10.7	 0.5	
Singapore	 -	 38.7	
Thailand	 0.6	 1.7	
Vietnam	 7.8	 0.1	
Source:	World	Bank	(2012)	
4.5.	Challenges	for	Connectivity	to	Narrow	the	Development	Gap	
The	Master	Plan	on	ASEAN	Connectivity	effectively	guides	member	countries	on	how	to	extend	and	
strengthen	 their	 links	 across	 a	 number	 of	 dimensions.	 However,	 countries	 face	 a	 number	 of	
challenges	in	adopting	the	plan	and	reaching	its	objectives.		
Global	 issues	 present	 one	 set	 of	 challenges	 for	 ASEAN	members.	 The	 recent	 GEC	 highlighted	 the	
dangers	of	an	export	oriented	growth	strategy	and	continuing	weak	growth	in	both	Europe	and	the	
US	has	 constrained	 the	demand	 for	ASEAN	exports	and	 reduced	public	 sector	budgets.	Moreover,	
the	Philippines,	Myanmar	and	Vietnam	are	found	to	be	among	the	ten	countries	with	the	greatest	
exposure	to	natural	hazards.	Combined	with	a	 limited	capacity	 to	respond,	 these	ASEAN	members	
are	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 great	 disruption	 to	 output	 and	 production,	 as	 well	 as	 damage	 to	
essential	infrastructure	in	the	event	of	a	major	natural	disaster	(Maplecroft,	2012).	
Another	major	challenge	relating	to	connectivity	is	to	ensure	that	the	often	asymmetric	benefits	of	
greater	connectivity	are	skewed	towards	the	poorest	countries	and	regions	and	that	growth	is	pro-
poor.	Unless	this	is	the	case,	greater	connectivity	could	lead	to	a	widening	rather	than	a	narrowing	
of	 the	 development	 gap.	 Specific	 challenges	 to	 improving	 physical,	 institutional	 and	 people-to-
people	connectivity	are	discussed	in	turn.	
4.5.1	Challenges	in	improving	physical	connectivity	
An	important	challenge	for	ASEAN	is	to	address	the	trade-offs	 in	prioritising	and	the	sequencing	of	
their	 physical	 infrastructure	 investments.	 The	 cost	 of	 delivering	 infrastructure	 in	 remote	 areas	 is	
often	 far	 higher	 than	 in	 urban	 areas.	 Often	 there	 will	 	 be	 a	 trade-off	 between	 	 directing	
infrastructure	 towards	 lagging	 or	 poorer	 regions,	 possibly	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 growth,	 but	 for	 the	
benefit	of	those	living	in	these	areas	(DfID,	2006).	This	will	be	necessary	to	narrow	the	development	
gap.	The	spatial	clustering	of	infrastructure	needs	consideration	in	order	to	maximise	its	benefits.		
In	order	to	preserve	the	quality	of	infrastructure,	ASEAN	must	also	strike	the	right	balance	in	funding	
the	maintenance	of	existing	 infrastructure	versus	the	funding	of	new	projects.	Straub	(2008)	notes	
that	 there	 is	 often	 a	 bias	 towards	 new	 infrastructure	 due	 to	 its	 greater	 visibility	 to	 electorates.	
However,	 lower	 than	 optimal	 maintenance	 expenditures	 are	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 higher	 operational	
costs.	
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The	 financing	 of	 ASEAN	 infrastructure	 requirements	 presents	 another	 challenge.	 ASEAN	 countries	
will	 require	 infrastructure	 investments	 amounting	 to	 an	 average	 investment	 of	 US$60	 billion	 per	
year	to	2015.	About	66	per	cent	of	this	amount	is	needed	for	new	projects	and	34	per	cent	for	the	
maintenance	of	 existing	 infrastructure	 (Bhattacharyay,	 2009).	 To	 assist	with	 the	massive	 financing	
requirements	for	regional	infrastructure,	ASEAN	members	with	the	ADB	have	established	the	ASEAN	
Infrastructure	Fund	(AIF).	The	initial	equity	of	the	AIF	will	be	US$485	million,	which	will	be	funded	by	
the	ASEAN	countries	 (US$335	million)	 and	 the	ADB	 (US$150	million).	 The	AIF	will	 initially	 fund	 six	
projects	a	year	and	has	a	total	lending	commitment	of	about	US$4	billion	to	2020.		With	co-financing	
from	the	ADB	and	other	partners,	 it	 is	anticipated	 that	 the	 fund	will	 leverage	$13	billion.	 It	 is	also	
hoped	that	the	fund	will	attract	some	of	the	currency	reserves	held	by	AMS	that	are	invested	outside	
of	 ASEAN,	 currently	 estimated	 at	 US$700	 billion	 (ADB,	 2012b).	 To	 meet	 ASEANs	 infrastructure	
requirements	sources	of	funding	other	than	the	AIF	are	required.	Bhattacharyay	(2009)	argues	that	
funding	should	come	from	AMS	savings	and	foreign	exchange	reserves	as	well	mobilising	resources	
from	other	Asian	countries	such	as	through	the	US$10	billion	China-ASEAN	Investment	Cooperation	
Fund	(CAICF)	and	that	there	is	also	a	need	to	develop	an	ASEAN	Infrastructure	Bond	Fund	
Large	infrastructure	developments,	particularly	regional	projects	carry	large	risks	and	are	therefore	
often	 funded	 by	 the	 public	 sector	 (ABD/ADBI,	 2009).	 Clearly	 meeting	 ASEAN’s	 infrastructure	
requirements	will	 be	 easier	with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 private	 sector.	 This	was	 recognised	 by	 the	
2009	ASEAN	Comprehensive	Investment	Agreement	aimed	to	facilitate	private	sector	investment	by	
improving	the	investment	environment	across	ASEAN	members.	Further,	infrastructure	projects	are	
often	very	costly	and	complex	and	Public	Private	Partnerships	(PPPs)	provide	a	means	to	supplement	
public	 sector	 resources	 and	 increase	 the	 efficiency	 of	 infrastructure	 projects.	 The	 ADB	 (2012a)	
outlines	the	following	benefits	of	PPPs:	(i)	the	easing	of	public	sector	debt	and	expenditure	burdens;	
(ii)	 assisting	 in	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 financial	 markets;	 (iii)	 improved	 administrative	
efficiency;	(iv)	better	service	provision;	and	(v)	stimulating	broader	economic	activity.	However,	the	
report	also	identifies	factors	contributing	to	their	failure	including	unforeseen	economic	conditions,	
a	lack	of	capacity,	uncertain/unreliable	legal	systems	and	a	lack	of	continuous	dialogue	between	the	
government	and	private	sector.			
Minimising	 the	environmental	 and	 social	 impacts	of	 large	 scale	 infrastructure	projects	will	 also	be	
vital	 for	 greater	 physical	 connectivity	 to	 effectively	 narrow	 the	 development	 gap.	 The	 negative	
impacts	 of	 displacement,	 pollution	 and	 deforestation	 must	 be	 planned	 for	 and	 minimised	 in	
undertaking	new	infrastructure	investment,	particularly	since	the	poor	often	disproportionately	bear	
the	brunt	of	these	impacts.	
Successfully	 integrating	 infrastructure	 programs	 that	 are	 being	 undertaken	 at	 the	 national,	 sub-
regional	and	regional	 levels	presents	a	great	challenge	for	ASEAN	members	 (Bhattacharyay,	2009).	
There	 are	 numerous	 projects	 being	 simultaneously	 implemented	 and	 one	 over-arching	 and	
comprehensive	strategy	needs	to	be	adopted	in	order	to	effectively	coordinate	projects	and	ensure	
that	 the	 projects	 which	 have	 the	 greatest	 potential	 in	 narrowing	 the	 development	 gap	 are	
prioritised.	
4.5.2	Challenges	in	improving	institutional	connectivity	
Globally,	 ASEAN	 countries	 on	 average	 do	 not	 rank	 very	 highly	 according	 to	 their	 enabling	
infrastructure	 or	 institutional	 connectivity.	 Further,	measures	 of	 such	 connectivity	 have	 stagnated	
over	the	past	five	or	so	years	and	greater	efforts	are	need	to	improve	the	quality	of	infrastructure	in	
order	to	narrow	the	development	gap.	
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Policies	and	procedures	governing	 trade	not	only	need	 to	be	strengthened	but	harmonised	across	
countries.	 This	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 RCB	 infrastructure	 projects.	 Bhattacharyay	 (2010)	
identifies,	 40	 major	 international,	 regional	 and	 subregional	 institutions	 and	 programs	 that	 have	
supported	 infrastructure	 development	 across	 Asia,	 again,	 strongly	 pointing	 to	 a	 need	 for	
harmonisation,	 coordination	 and	 integration.	 Some	 countries	 will	 need	 greater	 assistance	 in	
improving	the	quality	of	the	infrastructure	and	their	institutional	connectivity.	
4.5.3	Challenges	in	improving	people-to-people	connectivity	
There	isn’t	always	the	political	will	for	greater	labour	mobility	despite	its	potential	benefits	to	both	
sending	and	receiving	countries.		In	general	lowering	the	restrictions	on	the	movement	of	labour	will	
lead	 to	movements	 of	 people	 from	 poor	 regions	 to	 richer	 ones	 in	 search	 of	 employment,	 better	
wages	 rates	 and	 working	 conditions.	 Given	 the	 huge	 diversity	 in	 living	 standards	 across	 ASEAN	
countries,	very	large	numbers	of	people	from	CLMV	countries	would	move	to	neighbouring	Thailand,	
as	well	as	Malaysia,	Singapore	and	Brunei.		Firdausy	(2005)	notes	the	tensions	between	governments	
arising	 from	 the	 movement	 of	 workers	 from	 Indonesia	 to	 Malaysia	 and	 Singapore	 and	 from	 the	
Philippines	to	Malaysia.	Moreover,	given	the	millions	of	Burmese	already	in	Thailand,	there	is	likely	
to	be	political	will	for	only	a	very	gradual	easing	of	restrictions	on	the	movement	of	labour.	ASEAN	
needs	to	develop	policies	to	manage	both	large	outflows	of	 labour	from	some	members	as	well	as	
large	inflows	of	labour	to	others	(Menon,	2012).	
With	the	 increasing	rates	of	mobility	among	ASEAN	members,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	ensure	acceptable	
working	 conditions	 prevail	 across	 them.	 In	 2007	 ASEAN	 leaders	 signed	 the	 Declaration	 on	 the	
Protection	 and	 Promotion	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	 Migrant	 Workers	 which	 seeks	 to	 promote	 fair	 and	
appropriate	employment	protection,	payment	of	wages,	and	adequate	access	to	decent	working	and	
living	 conditions	 for	 migrant	 workers.	 The	 implementation	 of	 this	 declaration	 should	 be	 closely	
monitored.	 Moreover,	 ASEAN	 faces	 the	 challenge	 of	 providing	 universal	 social	 protection,	
particularly	for	those	in	the	informal	sector.8			
The	brain	drain	is	an	inevitable	issue	for	the	poorer	ASEAN	countries.	The	challenge	is	to	manage	it	
as	 best	 as	 possible	 and	 minimise	 its	 impacts.	 Improving	 wage	 levels	 and	 the	 living	 and	 working	
conditions	in	poorer	ASEAN	members	will	assist	in	reducing	the	incentive	for	skilled	professionals	to	
migrate.	A	policy	whereby	skilled	professionals	from	developing	countries	that	are	working	in	richer	
countries	 are	 taxed	 and	 the	 money	 returned	 to	 their	 home	 country	 was	 originally	 proposed	 by	
Bhagwati	(1977)	but	has	recently	renewed	interest	and	could	be	considered	by	ASEAN.	
4.6	Conclusion	and	Policy	Implications	
This	 chapter	 has	 provided	 strong	 evidence	 that	 physical,	 institutional	 and	 people-to-people	
connectivity	 can	all	 play	a	 crucial	 role	 in	narrowing	 the	development	gap.	 There	 is	no	 shortage	of	
empirical	evidence	that	confirms	the	 importance	of	physical	 infrastructure	 for	growth	and	poverty	
reduction.	Yet	to	maximise	physical	infrastructure’s	development	impact	a	supportive	and	enabling	
environment	must	also	exist.	Good	governance,	strong	institutions,	and	supportive	macroeconomic	
policies	 are	 vital	 if	 the	 potential	 gains	 from	 physical	 infrastructure	 are	 to	 be	 realised.	 Greater	
connectivity	and	fewer	restrictions	on	the	movement	of	people	as	well	as	goods	will	have	tangible	
impacts	on	narrowing	the	development	gap	among	ASEAN’s	members.		
Empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 physical	 infrastructure	 has	 its	 greatest	 impact	 in	 developing	
countries.	 ASEAN	 must	 therefore	 prioritise	 infrastructure	 investments	 in	 CLMV	 given	 the	 lower	
																																								 																				
8	 Pasadilla	 (2011)	 examines	 the	 portability	 of	 social	 security	 for	 cross-border	 workers	 in	 ASEAN.	 Portability	
refers	to	ability	to	transfer	social	security	benefits	across	countries.	She	finds	differences	 in	social	protection	
schemes	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 coverage,	 their	 exportability	 and	 the	 minimum	 qualifying	 periods	 for	 eligibility,	
concluding	that	greater	portability	is	needed	for	the	growing	number	of	migrant	workers	in	ASEAN.	
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development	 indicators	 that	 prevail	 in	 these	 countries.	 Projects	 in	 more	 rural	 and	 remote	 areas	
should	 be	 prioritised	 in	 other	 ASEAN	 members.	 Potential	 projects	 must	 be	 assessed	 not	 just	
according	to	whether	they	will	spur	economic	growth	in	ASEAN	countries	but	whether	growth	will	be	
pro-poor.	 This	will	 depend	not	only	on	 the	 location	of	 infrastructure	but	 also	whether	 it	 is	 biased	
towards	 the	 sectors	 in	which	 the	poor	 operate.	 The	poor	 can	benefit	 from	 infrastructure	 through	
income	earning	opportunities	and	access	to	services	and	the	academic	 literature	suggests	 that	 the	
poverty	reducing	impact	of	roads	appears	to	be	particularly	high.			
The	 Master	 Plan	 on	 ASEAN	 Connectivity	 provides	 a	 comprehensive	 outline	 for	 achieving	 greater	
connectivity	with	19	key	strategies	as	well	as	84	key	actions.	In	relation	to	physical	connectivity,	the	
evidence	 provided	 by	 this	 chapter	 indicates	 that	 priority	 should	 be	 given	 to	 the	 strategies	 of	 (i)	
completing	the	ASEAN	highway	network	which	will	integrate	by	road	lagging	parts	of	the	region;	(ii)	
establish	an	efficient	and	integrated	inland	waterways	network	which	is		more	relevant	to	the	ASEAN	
4;	 and	 (iii)	 establish	 integrated	 and	 seamless	 multimodal	 transport	 systems	 to	 make	 ASEAN	 the	
transport	hub	of	East	Asia	 (and	 in	particular	 construct	 the	missing	 link	of	 the	East	West	economic	
corridor	in	Myanmar).			
At	the	same	time,	the	negative	 impacts	of	physical	 infrastructure	and	greater	connectivity	need	to	
considered	and	addressed.	Large	scale	infrastructure	investments	can	lead	to	environmental	impacts	
such	as	water	and	air	pollution	as	well	as	social	impacts	including	the	displacement	of	communities	
as	well	connectivity	possibly	leading	to	more	crime,	illegal	immigration	and	people	trafficking.	
The	ADB/ADBI	(2009)	and	Bhattacharyay	(2010)	argues	that	an	effective	institutional	framework	for	
Asian	 connectivity	 is	 needed	 to	 strengthen	 existing	 institutions	 and	 provide	 a	 mechanism	 for	
ensuring	effective	 cooperation	and	 coordination.	A	Pan-Asian	 Infrastructure	 Forum	 is	 proposed	 to	
coordinate	and	integrate	existing	initiatives	with	the	Asian	Infrastructure	Fund	taking	responsibility	
for	 financing	 infrastructure	 development	 projects.	 The	 forum	 could	 be	 responsible	 for	 prioritising	
and	 coordinating	 regional	 infrastructure	 plans,	 harmonising	 standards	 and	 processes	 and	 dealing	
with	the	negative	economic	and	social	impacts	of	infrastructure	developments.	
Concurrently,	improving	the	soft	infrastructure	or	institutional	connectivity	of	some	ASEAN	countries	
must	also	be	a	priority.	ASEAN	members,	on	average,	don’t	perform	very	well	according	to	indicators	
of	 governance,	 the	ease	of	doing	business	and	 logistics.	However,	 there	 is	 great	diversity	 in	 these	
measures	across	ASEAN	members.	While	Singapore,	Malaysia	and	Thailand	rank	highly	considerable	
improvements	 need	 to	 be	 achieved	 by	 all	 other	ASEAN	 countries.	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 the	
competitiveness	of	ASEAN	countries	has	actually	 stagnated	over	 the	past	 five	years,	highlighting	a	
further	need	 to	 improve	policy	 and	 institutional	 environments.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	priorities	of	 the	
Master	Plan	 for	ASEAN	connectivity	 for	greater	 institutional	 connectivity	 should	be	 (i)	accelerating	
the	development	 of	 an	 efficient	 and	 competitive	 logistics	 sector;	 (ii)	 substantially	 improving	 trade	
facilitation	 in	the	region;	and	(iii)	 strengthening	 institutional	capacity	 in	 lagging	areas	 in	the	region	
and	improve	regional-sub-regional	coordination	of	policies,	programmes	and	projects.			
If	ASEAN	members	are	serious	about	narrowing	the	development	gap,	they	must	also	prioritise	and	
move	beyond	the	strategy	of	encouraging	greater	 intra-ASEAN	people	mobility	 in	the	Master	Plan.	
Progress	 in	 this	 area	 has	 been	 weak	 and	 limited	 to	 skilled	 labour	 mobility.	 However,	 restricting	
mobility	 to	 just	 skilled	 professions	 risks	 expanding	 rather	 than	 narrowing	 the	 development	 gap	
among	ASEAN	members.	The	policy	allows	the	richer	members	to	fill	gaps	in	their	labour	force	and	
while	poor	nations	might	benefit	 from	 the	 receipt	of	 remittances,	 they	will	 also	 suffer	brain	drain	
impacts.	While	it	is	recognised	that	greater	immigration	is	politically	difficult	more	progress	needs	to	
be	made	in	this	area.			
By	its	very	nature,	narrowing	the	development	gap	involves	asymmetries	in	both	costs	and	benefits.	
The	 ASEAN	 4	 stand	 to	 benefit	 more	 from	 greater	 physical,	 institutional	 and	 people-to-people	
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connectivity	 relative	 to	 other	 member	 countries.	 Richer	 ASEAN	 members	 must	 provide	 genuine	
financial	 and	 political	 commitments	 to	 narrowing	 the	 development	 gap,	 recognising	 that	 a	 more	
equitable	ASEAN	is	in	all	of	its	members’	long	term	interests.			
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Appendix	
Figure	A4.1:	Road	density	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)		
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	Data	for	GNI	per	capita	are	for	2010.	Data	for	road	density	are	
the	latest	available	between	2003	and	2010.	
	
Figure	A4.2:	Road	density	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	Data	for	GNI	per	capita	are	for	2010.	Data	for	road	density	are	
the	latest	available	between	2003	and	2010.	
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Figure	A4.3:	Mobile	phone	subscriptions	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).		
	
Figure	4.4:	Mobile	phone	subscriptions	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).		
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Figure	A4.5:	Electricity	power	consumption	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2009)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
	
Figure	A4.6:	Electricity	power	consumption	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2009)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
Figure	A4.7:	Governance	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	
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Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
	
Figure	A4.8:	Governance	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
Figure	A4.9:	Ease	of	Doing	Business	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	
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Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
	
Figure	A4.10:	Ease	of	Doing	Business	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
Figure	A4.11:	Logistics	Performance	Index	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	
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Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
	 	
Figure	A4.12:	Logistics	Performance	Index	and	GNI	per	capita	(PPP)	(2010)	(ASEAN	countries)	
	
Note:	Data	sourced	from	World	Bank	(2012).	
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